


B
945
R64P5

UC-NRLF



⌘B 45 005

YC 31324



JUN 29 1922

The Principle of Individuation

IN THE

Philosophy of Josiah Royce

BY
JOSEPH HOWARD PHILP, M.A., B.D.



A DISSERTATION

**Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of Yale University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.**

1916

The Principle of Individuation

IN THE

Philosophy of Josiah Royce

UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA

BY

JOSEPH HOWARD PHILP, M.A., B.D.

A DISSERTATION

**Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of Yale University
in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.**

1916

B943
R64P5

70 1000
AUGUST 1960

CONTENTS

Introduction—Chapter I.	5
Part I. Historical.....	10
Period I. Chapter II.—Exposition.....	10
Chapter III.—Critical.....	18
Period II. Chapter IV.—Exposition.....	26
Chapter V.—Critical.....	33
Period III. Chapter VI.—Exposition.....	36
Chapter VII.—Critical.....	47
Chapter VIII.—Summary on Individuation	57
Part II. Constructive Criticism.....	60
Chapter IX.—On the Absolute.....	60
Chapter X.—On Self-alienation	78
Conclusion ..	91

ERRATA—p-page; l-line.

I. Misspelled or wrong words.

- p. 5. l. 34—Philosophy.
- p. 12. l. 5—Relativity.
- p. 15. l. 33—Apply (not appear).
- p. 16. l. 15—Consciousnesses.
- p. 23. l. 31—Teleological.
- p. 29. l. 20—Brute.
- p. 31. l. 36—Expression.
- p. 34. l. 32—Arguing (not urging)
- p. 39. l. 18—Purpose.
- p. 40. l. 29—Emphasize.
- p. 41. l. 39—Insight.
- p. 45. l. 23—Earlier (not earliest)
- p. 49. l. 6—It (not is)
- p. 52. l. 39—As (not is).
- p. 61. l. 34—Absolute.
- p. 66. l. 38—Created.
- p. 67. l. 6—Foreknowledge.
- p. 79. l. 12—Chaos.
- p. 85. l. 9—Conscientiousness.
- p. 94. —Santayana.

OMIT—

- p. 6. l. 27—The content.
- p. 64. l. 23—Even.
- p. 85. l. 42—Only formally.

ADD—

- p. 47, at end of l. 37—Not.

MISTAKES IN FIGURES—

- p. 6—note 9, 409 (not 400)
- p. 12. l. 17—17 (not 15).
- pp. 16-17—notes 49 & 50—out of correct order.
- p. 17. l. 24—53 (not 58).
- p. 27. l. 18—10 (not 40).
- p. 29. l. 19—at 25 insert "
- p. 37—note 7—7 is missing.

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOSIAH ROYCE.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

I.

The aim of this thesis is to estimate the contribution which Prof. Royce has made on the question of the principle of individuation. It is a point on which monistic idealism must say something. And it is a point on which the answers of monism have been very unsatisfactory to their opponents.

The realist finds *his* problem in a search for the principle of *unity* among the world of facts. The idealist finds difficulty in making full provision in the unity for the finite *individuals*.

Possibly no idealist has written more comprehensively on the question than has Royce. And no idealist has sought to keep his doctrines grounded in empirical facts more than he has. The older absolutists *re-read* our actual thinking experience, our actual scientific consciousness, and our actual associative life in detail, in terms of that which gives them their reality. But if you posit some process of transmutation, not consciously experienced by us as finite, you can get almost any conclusion. Royce would leave our experiences in the region of the empirical. Our individual and social categories are to be valid in the infinite. Our lives are to be included in the absolute without any transmutation.¹

Royce is ever affirming that he goes only so far as the finite facts will allow. More room is thus left for the actual. He would satisfy the empirical scientist. The Absolute, in which he seeks to place finite beings and facts, is an absolute which he has demonstrated as the logical implication of the facts. He claims to be able to make the transition logically and truly in both directions.

Now it is submitted in this thesis that the Absolute is brought to the facts, not found there. The apparently larger concession to and reverence for the empirically given elements is mainly *nominal*. So far from finding the Absolute by way of logic, he seems to reach the Absolute by way of 'contrast'.² And this method is one which works in the realm of

1. See the Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 433. The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, 380. The World and the Individual, Vol. I, p. 426 f.

the conceptual.³ The finite is portrayed as so fragmentary that the completed whole rises in *imagination* on the other side. The true self that looms up through such contrast is the finite self.⁴ When we learn that "the true distinction, and the true connection, between the temporal and the eternal aspects of Being, furnish, in truth, the basis for a solution of this whole problem" "and are given no common ground between the two conceptions, we find ourselves at sea. To be told that "the eternal Now is simply not the temporal present,"⁵ seems of the essence of contrast,⁷ not of logic.

The contention is made here that the Absolute is an *imported* conception.

If we bear in mind however that Royce would carry over untransmuted into the Absolute finite facts and individuals, and if we add to this the *alternative*⁸ reading of the ultimate which he allows in his third period, (i.e. the ultimate is the Divine Community), we have a result which may claim to be no mere contrast but a logical conclusion. This alternative reading while it marks a distinct advance in emphasis on the social seems an *unadmitted* retreat⁹ from the engulfing Absolute. In his latest period, Royce, in following out the ontological meaning of loyalty, has been forced to ascribe something of the eternal and *underived* to the members of the community. But the *personal* or individual Absolute must then be another individual or the informing spirit of the community. Royce has

2. See the *Philosophical Review* (1902), p. 404. Prof. Dewey says "the fragmentariness, the transitoriness of our actual experience the content is magnified: . . . it affords by contrast the content of the definition of the Absolute."
3. Dewey, (o.c.), p. 406, claims that Royce is working with the formal. "Royce dives arbitrarily from the region of concepts into the chaotic sea of experience, and fishes out here and there just that particular experience which is required at that time to give body and tone to thin and empty categories."
4. See G. H. Howison, "The Conception of God," p. 104; or W. E. Hocking, "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," p. 290; or C. M. Bakewell, "The International Journal of Ethics," (vol. 12, p. 394) in a review of *The World and the Individual*.
5. *The World and the Individual*, vol. II, p. 347.
6. *The Conception of God*, p. 348.
7. See as example of mere contrast, *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 445. "In God we are real individuals, and really conscious Selves,—a fact which neither human thought nor human experience, nor yet any aspect of our present form of consciousness can make present and obvious to our consciousness, as now it is." How has the human being, Prof. Royce, learned about it?
8. I call it an alternative reading since I do not find the equivalence of the two readings to be proven. Royce seeks by postulating real individuality to social unities above the level of man, to merge finally such unities in the Absolute. But I do not know what is meant when we are told that these super-personal unities have 'minds'. It is the citizen who thinks, not the state. It is the citizen who has conscience, not the community.
9. See the *Problem of Christianity*, II, p. 296, 220, 270, I, p. 400. In private conversation Royce claims still to be an Absolutist, and refers to the illustration of the men and the boat. See the *Problem of Christianity*, II, pp. 46, 61, 242 f.

not adopted the former. The latter alone seems open to him and it is *not* the Absolute of the earlier periods.

II.

This change from the earlier absolutism, if admitted, frees Royce's work from a charge which is to the point against his earlier position. It is submitted that in such an Absolute as is treated of in the earlier periods, there is no room for real individuals. No amount of *portrayal* of the situation from one side or from the other makes the One and the Many really articulate. The grasping of the distinction and connection of the eternal and the temporal is *not* made clear. He oscillates between an eternal which is a grasping of the whole time-span and where all particular moments are alike to the eternal, and an eternal which is in each finite constituting it what it is. Further his whole treatment of the eternal and *future* time is unsatisfactory.

While (in contrast with Bradley) Royce would ascribe thought and will, selfhood and experience, to the Absolute, it must be noted that the capitalizing of these terms is a device which deludes. With us, thought always finds its objects beyond itself. For Thought there is concrete union with the objects. Here again it is submitted we have a contrast presented to oneself in imagination or conception not a logical and existent fact. So it is with the other individual and social categories which are taken as valid beyond the finite.

III.

Further, if we follow Royce, in his third period, in what I have called his alternative for the Absolute, we will find his treatment of the principle of individuation to be partial and inadequate.

The ultimate is the Divine Community. Individuation is then an ultimate feature of reality. The individual is eternal and underived. This being so reflection and conscious purpose and interpretation mark aspects of the making explicit of the potential. They are not the ultimate causes for actualization. Back of reflection and will lie less calculable impulses and desires. The impulse to live, to reflect, to will, are ultimately inexplicable.

Reflection and will seem to enter a field of want or difficulty already there. They are not primitive. What is primitive¹⁰ must contain, in germ at least, what comes later but it is reached in actual experimentation. It cannot be outlined in theory ahead of time. The facts of the social precede the postulating of man as social.

One may, in theory, declare that a life based on instincts and desires and impulses is one of anarchy. Yet out of the inchoate, primitive form of life the rational develops. Even the higher forms of individual life seem to attain a 'second nature', where reflection works like instinct at the first stage, i.e. there is a free and non-reasoning functioning of a life.

IV.

If we give up the futile endeavor to articulate the many in an Absolute and look at Royce's view of the true life for the many, the contention is made that the ethical ideal set forth is *self alienating*. In the concrete, life cannot be other than personal. The sources or springs of conduct are ever within rather than without.

It does not change the situation radically to emphasize that the choice of a cause is left to individual initiative. Even in the third period the cause a man is to serve is impersonal as regards himself. It is personal only in that it involves other persons.¹¹

The contention is put forward that our life is so complex that no Universal Will which all may follow can be found.¹² That which Royce has discovered is the empty formal principle, 'Will that there be such a will'. Life being thus so complex the individual, if he would have a career, not a chaos, must be the center of that career. Royce has used the method of magnified contrast, in reducing the individual¹³ to the private, to the merely private, to the absolutely isolated. It becomes

10. A. K. Rogers (in *The Philosophical Review* 1900, p. 160) says "Thought, from the biological standpoint, cannot possibly be regarded as an end in itself, but only as a function of the whole life-process. For psychological theory, the original datum is the organism already struggling to maintain and develop itself. It is from this that the life of conscious experience is slowly differentiated."

11. See *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 20. G. Santayana, (in *The Journal of Phil. Psy. and Scie Method* Nov. 25, '15, p. 649), asks "Why is true freedom so very unlike the blessed consciousness of being willingly a slave?"

12. A. K. Rogers (*The Philosophical Review* 1916, p. 162) says "we are led to define the *Summum Bonum* as the sum of the interests and satisfactions of all sentient creatures, not in so far as they possess some one identical content, but in so far as they are capable of living together harmoniously in the same world."

13. See *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 98.

an empty claim to individuality. On the other side is the world of objective situations and affairs. Of course one will choose this alternative as giving content to life. But it is submitted that this life of content will be chaotic without the center of selfhood around which it must be organized. Such contrast is not logic and outside the merely formal, in the world of objective situations we find that life centers around selves.

Not only is the world too large and complex for one to find an unequivocal Universal Will, but, the world being composed of many individuals, the question of unanimity on the exact meaning of the Universal Will becomes a vexing problem. 'So many Gods, so many creeds' says a poet. How is one to know or choose among the rival claimants for one's loyalty? Royce seems very obscure at this point.

If I find myself at odds with a neighbor in our interpretation of this Will, I shall be less an individual if I drop my own view to follow his. And if I seek to follow the gleam for myself, I will have great difficulty in making my neighbor accept my position as impersonal and unbiased.

In fact, it is submitted that it is only in *conception* that one can build up a world in which the self and its satisfactions are sunk in larger causes. On the contrary, in actual life the source of all initiative is personal, and at every stage the self is still the center of its own life and still estimates, in terms of its own satisfactions, the value of objective situations and events and causes.

PART I.—HISTORICAL.

Period I.—

CHAPTER II.

Exposition.

I.

For the purpose of this thesis, the writings of Prof. Royce are divided into three periods.¹ In the first period, the principle of individuation in the finite is 'Reflection'. In the second, it is 'will'. In the third, it is 'loyalty' or the 'will to interpret'.

In the first period, Royce is seeking primarily to demonstrate the reality of the 'Absolute'. In the second, he seeks to make clear the principle of individuation and also to articulate fully the One and the Many, the 'World and the Individual'. In the third period, we are given the social or ethical implications of the metaphysical position which Royce occupies.

In the first period he is reacting against a metaphysics based on evolution.² The long processes in evolutionary descent seem to Royce to be an *historical* succession only if behind or in all the change there is the permanent. In the second period, he shows that adequate place is given to the finite individual in the Absolute whose existence he has demonstrated. In the third period, the ethical and social implications in the finite are elaborated to show the *significant* place in reality which the finite occupies.

II.

At the time the first book was written scientists were asking, What are the facts? Some of philosophic bent were constructing a metaphysics on the basis of these evolutionary sciences. Their ultimate was 'Nature', 'Natural Law', 'Humanity' or an 'Unknowable'.³

1. (a) The Religious Aspect of Phil. (1885). The Spirit of Modern Philosophy (1892). The Conception of God (pp. 3-50) (1895). (b) The Conception of God (Supplementary Essay) 1897. The World and the Individual, 2 vols. 1899, 1901. (c) The Philosophy of Loyalty (1909). The Sources of Religious Insight (1911). The Problem of Christianity, 2 vols. (1913). There are also two books of essays and some reprints of articles in periodicals. (1) Studies in Good and Evil. (2) Wm. James and Other Essays.

Royce seeks an answer to the question, What is a fact? The answer, he finds in following out the logical implications of the fact. He finds a positive doctrine of an Absolute. The world-primary is 'Thought'. Such Thought he holds to be a 'person'.⁴ The world in time, of which evolution has so much to say is a temporal manifestation of this personal life. For Royce, 'the far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves'⁵ is eternally existent. "Time is once for all present in all its moments to a universal all-inclusive thought."⁶

The facts, whose logical implications are examined by Royce, are the nature of the 'ought',⁷ of 'religious faith',⁷ of 'finite selfhood',⁸ of 'finite experience'.⁹ The examination of the "possibility of error"¹⁰ is his favorite¹¹ demonstration in proving the reality of the Absolute. In his treatment of the doctrine of the Absolute, we have thus much of Royce's views as to the nature of the finite individual and of the principle of individuation.

The method, which is characteristic of the logic of Royce's doctrine, and one which he explicitly states, is this. "The only demonstrable truths of an ultimate philosophy relate to the constitution of an actual realm of experience, and to so much only about the constitution of this realm as cannot be denied without self-contradiction." That truth is "Absolute", which if you deny, "you implicitly affirm."¹² In the sense of imperfection, defeat, error, or incompleteness, we find logical implications of a positive doctrine of reality as it is.

2. See *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 6, 11, 43, 167, 221 f, 228, 237, 245, 280, 401, 430. 3. (See *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*) p. 6.

4. See the use of the personal pronoun in *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 433 f. In *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 380, he uses the word 'person' of the Absolute. In *'The World and the Individual'*, vol. II, p. XIV, writing of his earliest book, he says in it he ascribed 'conscious individuality' to the Absolute.

5. Compare with Tennyson—Browning (*Paracelsus*).

"All tended up to mankind,
And man produced, all hath its end thus far,
But in completed man begins anew
A tendency to God."

6. *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 423. See also pp. 443, 484.

7. (See *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*,) Bks. I. & II.

8. See *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 368-380.

9. See *The Conception of God*, pp. 3-50.

10. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, Ch. XI.

11. It was the subject of his thesis for the Doctor's degree and is referred to in different places in his books. See *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. XIII. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 371. *The Conception of God*, pp. 166, 342. *Studies in Good and Evil*, pp. 140, 163. *The World and the Individual*, vol. II., p. VI. f. Without a preliminary statement showing the complete identity of the object of knowledge and the object in the real world, a proof based on the nature of thought is open to ambiguity. Conceptual completeness is so easy to reach.

12. *The World and the Individual*, vol. I, p. XI.

III.

If 'error' is possible there is a *real* difference between truth and error. If evolution or a stream of successive events were the last word, our standards of truth and error would be tentative—if, indeed, we would have any sense of continuity. The doctrine of Total Relativity goes beyond 'reasonable doubt'. "It tries to put scepticism to rest, by declaring the opinion, 'that there is error', to be itself an error."¹³ But "if there is no real distinction between truth and error then the statement that there is such a difference is not really false, but only seemingly false."¹⁴ This is the ultimate test. "That real error exists is absolutely indubitable."¹⁵ Hence the finite being is capable of valid thought.¹⁶

Where then is the criterion of truth and error? It is not the subjective standard of so-called psychological idealism, for "if my mind can be concerned only with its own ideas, then sincerity and truth are identical, and truth and error will be alike impossible."¹⁵ In such a case, I could make *correct* assertions about the content of my thought. But we mean by truth more than mere correctness.

There is more adequacy in the "commonplace assumption that a statement of mine can agree or fail to agree with its real object, when this object is wholly outside my thought."¹⁸ The finite thinker is one "whose thought has objects outside of it with which it can agree or disagree."¹⁹ If this is true of each, it is true of all finite beings and the reality of truth and error cannot be explained on "the consensus of men" or by a show of hands.

Again, this question of the reality of truth and error is not

13. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 394. 14. *Ibid*, p. 375. 15. *Ibid*, p. 395.

16. This is not merely to say that, however critical one may be of thought's activity, one must start with this necessary assumption that thought is capable of reaching valid results. No doubt it is the "reflexive turn", the "absolute assurance" of the subject—as indicated in "The Meaning of God in Human Experience", p. 191 f. by W. E. Hocking. Royce in turning in on the subject wishes to see what the 'subject' is. He finds the subject is in reality the Absolute as Subject.

17. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 378. D. S. Miller in the *Philosophical Review* (1893) p. 403 f. has sought to show the vicarious nature of knowledge which carries past experiences in image, kinesthesia or other symbolic equivalent. He thinks that this meets Royce on the nature of error, in that the finite knower himself carries the corrective of the error in this vicarious form. An inclusive mind would not then be needed. James (in "The Meaning of Truth" p. 22, note) agrees with Miller. The problem of Royce is however just that which Miller assumes, viz.: the significance of our knowing actual reality. Miller's work is a study in the psychology of an individual. Royce is dealing with the metaphysical question.

18. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 378. 19. *Ibid*. p. 377.

one which time fixes. We say that time will prove one right or wrong. But if it will be right in the future it must be right in the present. "The future is now, as future, non-existent, and so judgments about the future lack real objects."²⁰ Truth does not depend, for its infallibility, on the outcome of the temporal process. My judgment is about real objects and is true or false *now*. I do not "make" but "find"²¹ truth. One can speak neither truly nor falsely about a merely "possible"²² object.

The agreement or disagreement of my thought with objects outside of it "can be possible, only if there is a thought that includes both my thought and the object wherewith my thought is to agree. This inclusive thought must be related to my thought and its objects as my thought is related to the various partial thoughts that it includes and reduces to unity in any one of my complex assertions."²³ My judgment is true or false according as it agrees with or differs from this all-embracing thought. And 'Time', in which I become aware of the accuracy of my thought, is "present in all its moments to a universal and all-inclusive thought"²⁴ "in the unity of one eternal moment"²⁵ Further a judgment, to "be false when made, must be false before it was made. An error is possible only when the judgment in which the error is to be expressed always was false"²⁶ This all-inclusive thought has present to itself "all possible relations of all the objects in space, in time, or in the world of the barely possible."²⁷ It is thus an "absolute rational unity." "Our thought needs the Infinite Thought in order that it may get, through this Infinite judge, the privilege of being so much as even an error"²⁸ and "save for Thought there is no truth, no error, in separate thoughts."²⁹ The finite being is "a part of the universal life."³⁰

In the finite individual, thought and its objects are never fully united. Evolution holds out to thought the hope that the future will bring fulfilment. Royce sees the 'meaning' of thought as indicating that such fulfilment is eternally present in the Absolute. The Thought of the Absolute is ever

20. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 422 f. 21. *Ibid.* p. 431. 22. *Ibid.* p. 428 f. 23. *Ibid.* p. 377 f. Here we see reference to finite thought as a true unity in variety or variety in unity. This has reference not to thought in relation to its objects, but in itself as it faces its world of objects. In *The World and the Individual*, vol. I, p. 490 f. Royce lays emphasis on this as something present in the finite corresponding to the unity of the Absolute.

24. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 423. 25. *Ibid.* p. 441. 26. *Ibid.* p. 424 f. 27. *Ibid.* p. 425. 28. *Ibid.* p. 427. 29. *Ibid.* p. 432. 30. *Ibid.* p. 381.

one with its object. The persistent incompleteness in the temporal, indicates that the true self of the fragmentary finite self is the Absolute. We are parts of the Infinite Subject.

Again this Thought is inclusive of "Will and Experience,"³¹ and refers "not only to finite processes of thinking, but also and expressly to the inclusive Whole of Insight; in which both truth and value are attained, not as objects beyond Thought's ideas but as appreciated and immanent fulfilment or expression of all the purposes of finite thought."³²

The logic of the facts of 'error' has thus led up to the conception of an 'All-Thinker'. This whole has constituted a world in which we find what we term finite individuals.³³ In these finite beings is a power of thinking or 'Reflection', which is able to transcend the temporal. The objects of this reflection are ever 'beyond it', a separation which it never overcome in the temporal. "Moments of Insight"³⁴ come when, in ideal, the separation is overcome. This is not a mystic vision since it is a product of reflection.

IV.

The finite being is as 'thinker' a true 'part' of the Absolute as Thinker, and is capable of valid thought. This is true of the finite as a reflective being facing its world of objects. If true individuality means the complete union of thought with its objects, then finite beings are complete only in the Absolute. The temporal is 'Appearance' not reality.³⁵ The true self of each finite being is the Absolute.

This Absolute as Subject has individuated himself ("cut itself up"³⁶) into the world of individuals, or "separate empirical selves". With the passing of the empirical, reunion of the

31. 'The Religious Aspect of Philosophy' pp. 433, 435.

32. Quoted from *The World and the Individual*, vol. I, pp. IX f. where Royce is referring to this usage, in the earlier work, of the term Thought.

33. It must be emphasized that Royce is not showing that the finite is merely the object of the Absolute Knowledge (As James interprets him—see "A Pluralistic Universe" p. 36). The finite individual is a constituent element of the Absolute Energy. (See Bosanquet—"The Principle of Individuality and Value" p. 372 note). As a constituent element of the Absolute mind, not as an object of the Absolute thought, thought in the finite is a true "unity in variety" or variety in unity, and is a true fragment or part of the Absolute as Subject.

34. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 156.

35. F. H. Bradley in "Truth and Reality" p. 250 writes: "We have appearance whenever, and so far as, the content of anything falls outside of its existence, its 'what' goes beyond its 'that'. You have reality on the other hand so far as these two aspects are inseparable, and where one may, perhaps, be said to reconstitute the other."

36. See this expression—*The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 194.

parts takes place for "we know nothing of individual immortality."³⁷ The part, as a separated individual, has a *temporal* appearance only.

In the 'part', the individuating principle of the Absolute is present as 'reflection' or as 'finite thought'. At work in the finite, to bring it to simplicity and unity, is found this power of thought. "Moments of insight" give needed direction. The finite individual glimpses his true self and henceforth his aim is to live the part. In the temporal, he seeks to realize the will of the Absolute.

Finite 'thought', then, is that which marks the finite individual as man. Its active endeavor is to grasp, in unity and simplicity, the world of objects beyond it. It is *the intellectualistic or reflective power* in the finite individual which is meant. Royce in his theory of the Absolute would trace this individuating thought back to its eternal spring. Whether or not one agrees with this Absolutism, the doctrine remains that reflection or thinking in man individuates the finite. It is that which constitutes him a human being.

V.

I have given, somewhat fully, the use Royce makes of "the possibility of error." In a similar manner, other finite facts are made to yield up their ontological significance. In "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy" (Book I.), the meaning of 'oughtness' is traced out. It implies a world-will, inclusive of all wills and purposes as its 'parts'.³⁸ Finite wills are constituent elements of this central purpose, not mere objects of that purpose. This answer to the moral demand construes the world in terms which meet the demands of religious faith. The world is a "World of Divine Life".³⁹ This insight has come from within the finite consciousness, not from without.⁴⁰

37. The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 478. See also p. 440. In "The World and the Individual", vol. II, p. XIII, our author writes that at the time he wrote the earlier book, he was not clear as to how his doctrine would appear in the question of the immortality of the individual. In "The Conception of God" pp. 75, 140, 322-326, we see evidence of a change from the doctrine as stated in The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. For St. Thomas (Q. LXXVI, Art. 11.) the immaterial souls of men are first individuated by the bodies they assume. The inclination to an individual body still individuates it on the passing of the empirical. See the Conception of God, p. 227.

38. See the Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 141, 217, 380 f. 437, 457.

39. Ibid p. 436. 40. Ibid. p. 470.

The finite 'self', with a world of other minds and objects of its thought beyond the self, is seen to be, in reality, one with them. "You, in one sense, never do or can get beyond your own ideas, nor ought you to wish to do so, because in truth all those other minds, that constitute your outer and real world, are in essence one with your own self."⁴¹ "Your total of normal consciousness already has the object."⁴² There is thus no prison of the inner self. In thinking, the self actively means or refers to its object. It must "in some measure already possess that object, enough, namely, to identify it."⁴³ as what the self means. Each finite self, imperfect always as finite, is seen complete as the Absolute. "There is, at last, but one self, organically, reflectively inclusive of all selves, and so of all truth."⁴⁴ "This Self,"⁴⁵ infinitely and reflectively, transcends our consciousness, and therefore since it includes us, it is, at the very least, a person and more definitely conscious than we are."⁴⁶

In the California Lecture, the recognized incompleteness of human 'experience' is shown as implying a 'completed' experience. In finite experience, there is divorce between ideas and their objects. In 'Experience', "true ideas are fulfilled, confirmed, and verified."⁴⁷ For the Absolute, "All genuinely significant, all truly thinkable ideas would be seen as directly fulfilled, and fulfilled in his own experience."⁴⁸

The Absolute constitutes⁴⁹ the initial or rather the eternal individuation of selves, or wills. These finite selves, guided by reflection, seek actively to conquer or understand their environing world. This process of experience⁵⁰ is ever temporally

49. See "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy" p. 462. "The Infinite thinks them". See also 456, "in thinking thee."

50. In this change of terminology from 'thought' to 'experience' we see an evidence of

41. *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 368. 42. *Ibid.*, p. 371. 43. *Ibid.* p. 370.

44. *Ibid.* p. 379.

45. We have throughout Royce's statement of the nature of a 'self' an oscillation rather than a true passage from one idea of 'self' to another. The word 'self' is used in the first place, of the unity of consciousness, as opposed to the multiplicity of its content. It is used also in the sense of the concrete self of finite experience. To say that subject and object are indivisible means simply that an object cannot be conceived except as existing within a unity of consciousness. Here we are dealing with knowledge in the abstract or so-called representative sense. But when references are made to the concrete self and the object is said to have no existence outside the finite subject, we have the unity of the other meaning of self carried over illegitimately. In the concrete self there is no promise of that inclusive unity which implies that the universe may be conceived as a concrete experience or a single consciousness.

46. "The Spirit of Modern Philosophy" p. 380. There is no trace here of any transmutation of the finite selves in being included. Bosanquet (*The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 387 f. See also p. 373.) criticizes Royce on this point.

47. "The Conception of God" p. 9. 48. *Ibid.* p. 10.

incomplete. The 'parts' have always thus a fragmentary time-experience. Eternally, each is complete in or as the Absolute.

Reflection or thinking is that which individuates the finite in the time order. Insight enables the finite to see his relation to the whole and thus to live his life truly by seeking to will the Universal Will.

The Absolute, whether considered as 'Thought' or 'Self' or 'Experience', is a direct, immediate and eternal union of Thought with its objects; a Self, not merely thinking validly, but concretely; an Experience which is complete, its ideas eternally fulfilled. It is this Absolute which individuates⁵¹ the finite thinker, not as an object of his thought, but as a constituent element of himself as Subject. Just why this individuation takes place we are not informed. It is.

The finite 'part' carries over into the temporal some of the same power of individuation. This is 'reflection'. This principle of individuation operates in the time-experience to constitute man as individual. From the side of consciousness⁵² in the finite being, Royce would thus reach logically a doctrine of a world-consciousness.

Divine Thought then is the principle of individuation in the universe. Reflection is the form in which it appears as the 'parts' of the Absolute. The Divine Thought in its larger implications is attained in insight in the consciousness⁵³ of the part.

that pragmatic tendency current to-day. Royce is changing from a more 'structural' idea of reality to a functional or dynamic one. Thought is being subordinated to thinking. Reality is being read in dynamic—not in static terms. Now just as Royce admits 'thought' to be a dealing with objects in some sense beyond the thinker, so 'experience' seems equally to have to do with objects which are outside in some sense. When I possess a description of reality, I am not in direct and immediate union with the objects out there. Finite experience may be regarded as holding the greater part of its possessions in a representative way. A short stretch of time, the present, is direct and immediate. Increase of Knowledge means with us not so much the widening of direct experience as the increase of that which is held in a representative way. Completeness for us would not mean one single and direct experience of the whole.

51. In the "Studies in Good and Evil" pp. 198-248, Royce sets forth a conception of nature as an individual with an apperceptive span different from man's.

52. In "Implications of Self-Consciousness" in "Studies in Good and Evil" pp. 140-168, Royce has further outlined this argument.

53. See The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 470.

CHAPTER III.

Critical.

I.

The interest in this period of our author's work centers around the proof of the reality of an Absolute. It raised other questions which it leaves unanswered. The individuation, initiated in and by the Absolute, is only treated incidentally. Where, in such an Absolute, provision is made for the reality of the finite, is a question that can also be raised. Of this latter problem only a little will be said here. Fuller notice will be taken of it in Part II. It persists throughout Royce's work.

It seems clearly our author's view that reality, as Thought, is thought fully and concretely fulfilled, a completed experience, idea in perfect union with its object in one eternal instant. It is not clear where in such a finished universe there is any place for *free* individuals even as mere thinkers, to say nothing of real activity on the part of the finite.¹ A completed experience would seem to leave no room for even such novelties as a movement of reflective thought which is a kind of experience. It is submitted that in a finished universe, or in a completed experience, there is no reality in 'time experience' or 'free' individuals. It does not make it less impossible, to postulate 'degrees of reality'. If my thinking, as psychical fact, and my activities involving the environing world, are all there eternally, it seems impossible to account for my sense of pioneering, of responsibility. Or does the Whole take care to provide even this 'feeling' of being free?

We have noted already that Royce does not think of the finite consciousness as the *object* of the thought of the Absolute but as a constituent element of the Absolute as Subject. It participates in the nature of the Absolute. If this Subject, individuated into constituent elements, is eternally fulfilled in

1. Hy Jones in the "Hibbert Journal" vol. I, No. I, in reviewing Royce's Gifford Lectures says "He adopts Mr. Bradley's doctrine of thought and, from that point of view, the substitution of the categories whole and part for those of appearance and reality is not possible, nor therefore a positive defence of both the finite and the infinite."

its object, then the 'parts' are fulfilled also. There is to be no duplication of thought or experience. Time-experience seems some isolated extra, unaccountably thrown in. If the 'parts', as such, are not eternally fulfilled, then their fulfilment in time may be real, but only at the expense of the 'finishedness' of the world. Inasmuch as Prof. Royce would cling, as a point of departure, to finite fact, it would seem contradictory to reach logically a position which would enable him to count the point of departure something less than real. In view of the large place given in the later periods to the work and activities of men and society, we must believe that Royce counts the finite individual as real. A "completed experience" however makes the growing, changing finite less than real.

If one is to keep in touch with finite experience while tracing out the logical boundaries, it might be objected that in finite experience a 'completed experience' is one which has ended and is already past. Our experiences have that way of passing as they are completed. Just what an experience eternally *complete* and eternally *present* would mean is something, an analogy for which I do not find in my experience. On the other hand, experience presents us with many instances where one's mind or purpose becomes so clear-cut and well-defined that as an active purpose it functions without inner change.² It has become a fixed principle. Finite experience presents us with a tendency to a reasonable and unchanging identity in the individual as he embodies his life-purpose and produces novelties in life-content. Might we not think of a world infinitely unfinished, of a fully-defined³ and hence absolutely unchanging Purpose, embodying itself in this universe? The identity would move forward unchanged. This would leave room for free individuals and a *real* time-experience. The contributions of the free individual, however infinitesimally small, would yet be *real*. It is enough at this point to show that a *real* finite and a completed 'Experience' are incompatible.

2. H. A. Overstreet (in *The Phil. Rev.* 1909 p. 7 f.) has sought to harmonize thus "Change and the Changeless". This, a theory of reality, would differ from that of Royce in not making time unreal. It is a truly dynamic conception.

3. It would be necessary to note that a fully-defined purpose or principle in the finite is not one which is formulated in exact detail as to its future application. So the perfectly defined Purpose or Will of the Absolute is not to be conceived as fixing before-hand the complete manner of its application.

II.

According to this logic of Prof. Royce, he demonstrates the nature and *existence* of a Being in full and perfect-union with the objects of his thought. The demonstration is based on the nature of finite thought. This logic is open to question for this so-called *concrete* union finds no analogy in the *finite*.

I find in my experience that the conditions of truth and error involve in me an ever widening *knowledge* of reality. I have a focus in consciousness and it gives, no doubt, a short stretch of direct experience. But attention, as I possess it, must know continual change. I find that much of the interest of life consists in passing to new phases of experience. That which is passed is carried over by me in some sort of representative way. My *experience*, per se, does not show any signs of such widening as might mean, as an ultimate, the one fixed vision of the whole. The conditions of attention would be violated and the sense of monotony rather than interest would result.

When I look at this direct experience, I find that while directly or concretely present it is not actual union with or immanence of myself in the objects. Indeed the objects ever remain beyond my thought which remains always a thought of reality. There is no basis then for the concrete union ascribed to Thought.

It is rather an ever widening *knowledge* of reality, rather than *experience* of it, which is found to be significant in my experience. There is the difference between the representation of the thought of reality as experienced in the past and the present. It is a difference of time rather than a difference involving in present experience a direct union with reality. I know I have seen a book. It was yesterday. Right now I see it again. My thought has been compared with the perception in either case. In the former case, psychology tells us there comes up some physiological representative of the former perception. In the latter case, I have the original perception present. But now in either case very much more is involved in the physical book than my perceiving and thinking of it. As a concrete thing it has not been in complete union with my thought. My perception of the book indicates that it is there apart from any private experience of mine. The

object of my thought will not be literally the book and all it actually is. But I know that this object of my thought, this intellectual content, has reference to a real object in the existent or physical world.

Our thought, with its problems of truth and error, does imply a completed unity. It is the unity of a whole of *knowledge*. It is not a single and complete *experience* of reality, but a complete *knowledge* of reality. But this is an ideal. No doubt it implies the bringing together of all reality within a single whole. It is not however there literally and physically, but in knowledge form.⁴

Only in this form of a moving experience and an accumulating of knowledge of reality, do we seem to do justice to other psychological features. It is not possible to feel uncertainty and certainty on the same point and feel them simultaneously. All the personal sense of ignorance, evil or error, implies other experiences in which they may be overcome. My actual feelings of ignorance and of recovery from it imply a widening knowledge through further experiences. To crowd both into a single experience as contemporaries is to do injustice to the psychological coloring of the facts. A sense of error and of truth recovered belongs to a part of reality, not to the whole. The former carries its own coloring or feeling tone which cannot be transferred to another.

My point is this, that our thought is ever an ideal representation of reality, never an actual or concrete union with it. Logic cannot give, on the basis of finite facts, such concrete union. Only a conceptual contrast, based on the wholeness yet limited nature, of finite experience as direct and immediate, can give the conception of some synoptic vision that in an instant might envisage the totality. And such can be but a conception or imaginative presentation.

If one wishes to round out logically, on the basis of finite thought, the nature of reality, one might hold that there is at least a society of knowers or selves. Certainly one advances beyond his knowledge and its logic when he postulates an all-inclusive Thought or Selfconsciousness. We have no finite experience furnishing an analogy of a self or consciousness having such an experiential relation to the objects of its thought

4. The Philosophical Review (1903) p. 48 f. A. K. Rogers on Prof. Royce and Monism.

that there is no trans-subjective reference. Closing that gap is not the logic of existent facts but a conceptual construction.

III.

The other question left ambiguous is that of the principle of individuation. The possible embodiments of finite thought seem indefinitely many⁵ when viewed conceptually. 'Thought' or the Absolute includes not only all actual experiences but all possible experiences. This would seem to mean 'innumerable' worlds. But we have in reality *one* world. Reflection presents us with alternatives which, if not equally acceptable, seem equally possible. Royce discusses⁶ the simpler forms of knowledge and indicates the positive or active nature of the mental process. The mind seeks unity and simplicity. Attention "fixes on only a portion of the field at a time." It makes a difference to sense-impressions whether or not they are in the focus of consciousness. Attention is active in increasing and diminishing the intensity of impressions. The measure of effort which accompanies attention affects qualitatively the impression received. "Attention is the same activity that in a more developed shape we commonly call will." Attention, in thus narrowing our focus, "makes all our knowing and believing possible." Along with attention we find recognition. It too tends to alter the data of sense towards order and simplicity. Our interest also will be seen as affecting our resultant knowledge. Thus "the most insignificant knowledge is in some sense an original product of the man who knows. In it is expressed his disposition, his power of attention, his skill in recognition, his interest in reality, his creative might."

Here we have an aspect of the finite which, with the greater emphasis of the second period, developed into the Voluntarism for which Royce stands in the academic world. It explains the selective nature of finite thought. But the selectiveness is far from absolute. Other possibilities linger on the horizon.

Reflection guides the finite individual. The sense of direction is reached in "Moments of Insight". These short-lived

5. Royce, in the next period, writes "It is of the nature of pure or abstract thinking to deal with endless possibilities." 'The Conception of God' p. 193.

6. The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 308-323.

7. F. H. Bradley denied that any of our categories apply to the Absolute. Royce agrees with regard to physical categories only. The categories expressive of the human individual are applicable. At least he claims to carry over these categories. It is a criticism offered in this thesis that the categories of the finite are not carried across unchanged.

moments reveal in ideal the fruition of the categories⁷ followed laboriously by reflection. The 'oneness' of the world is an open book in the moment of insight but the way to it is not so clear. Reflective thought, with its point of departure in finite fact, does not make clear how 'Thought' constitutes *one* world and finds complete fulfilment in it. Reflection takes up its task where individuation has already done much of its work. We are conscious before we are self-conscious.

The treatment, given above of attention and recognition and interest, seems psychological rather than metaphysical. In the acquisition of new knowledge, we are affected by our previous experiences. We hold our past in a vicarious way, in images or kinesthesia or in some other symbolic form. One might say that our history is one where each new experience has its effect on the psychic organism and helps to constitute one's psychic attitude. But I carry the objects of my knowledge in a *vicarious* way, not in the *concrete* direct way of immediate union with them which is ascribed to 'Thought'. We do not, in our thinking of the world of objects, reach such union with the real objects as to constitute or reconstitute them what they are. Finite thinking, as such, does not imply this individuating or constitutive power ascribed to Thought.

There is a distinction which we must not ignore between the object as it enters our limited life of immediate experience, and the object as it exists in a world which we reconstruct indirectly by thought and whose connections are independent of our practical teleology. One must separate carefully between the real world and the knowledge of the world which one possesses. Connections exist objectively in the real world. But in my experience I make connections. Only in this practical, teleological⁸ way does cause enter into the constitution of 'finite experience'. Existence for knowledge, and existence for experience are not essentially convertible terms. It seems to me that Royce makes them synonymous. There is never that immediate presence of reality in the very thought-experience of finite beings. Reality is brought home to us by a thought

8. There may be two meanings given to teleology. It may imply an end to the action as a distinct result. Here the activity itself is only a means to that end. All positive value will lie in the result — not in the activity. This seems to me to make the essence of reality a static fact. Progress would be only a mere incident in attaining the end. The second meaning is that the end is actually realizing itself in life. There is value in the process per se. It is not a question merely of a finished result or attainment. Royce in 'Thought', 'Self' or 'Experience' seems to imply the former type of teleology, whereas in finite experience it is clearly the latter which is present.

distinct from it. Hence it is no logic but a bare contrast that enables Royce to see in finite 'experience' that which logically implies an Absolute, or a direct and immediate experience.

IV.

A further question which will be more fully treated in Part II. relates to the ideal of duty held up to the finite individual. As a part⁹ of the infinite Subject, and on becoming aware, in his consciousness, of this relation to the whole, his supreme task is to will the Universal Will. He must thus return into the life of the whole.

One may call this a doctrine of self-alienation for one must seek "impersonal"¹⁰ ends. Self-consciousness would seem to carry with it the ideal of self-negation or resignation as its true direction. Now in theory this might seem plausible. But in actual life the springs of action are ever personal. There will be carried over at the start of a life where the self is sunk in the universal will something of the impetus which will rise from the choice as personal. But it is true to life that such impetus will wane.

One might indeed doubt whether altruism as an ideal is not both abstract and unreal. Self-love takes many forms. Altruism is one of them. It is very doubtful if it is the highest.

Royce notes that we learn the meaning of the Divine Thought in our consciousness.¹¹ It will bear all the marks of a personal interpretation and of spontaneous origination. How one may make another aware of its impartiality or impersonality seems problematic. Not only so but, mediated through human consciousness, it will come forth in all sorts of partial forms. Which shall the individual follow, his own or another's? Which is most like the archetype?

Prof. Royce would no doubt say that no one finite will, as finite, represents the Universal Will. It seems then one will have left just the bare, empty will to have the Universal

9. In the Supplementary Essay in Vol. I of the Gifford Lectures Royce illustrates the part-whole relation from the analogy of self-representative systems in Mathematics. The part is equal to or is the image of the whole. It may be that Royce intends the illustration to be more than an analogy. But in a true infinite the individuated element images the whole, not in a wooden one-to-one correspondence, but in a differentiated response to organic necessities. See on this point Bosanquet "The Principle of Individuality and Value" pp. 38, 393 f. The mathematical system is abstract or empty of content. The true infinite is concrete.

10. See *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 211, 212, 213. 11. *Ibid.* p. 470.

Will, the will that there shall be such a Will¹² As this is an ideal rather than an embodied fact, to which one may give adherence, it seems impossible to get away actually from "personal" aims and ideals. If the Infinite Subject has individuated into a world of finite individuals, will not these 'parts' be such in reality only when as 'parts' they *achieve* a richer individual content? It is something to give one's life to the whole. Can one do more? Yes. By having more to give. This will be found in a greater emphasis on the final value of the personal.

12. We have here not an attaining of a concrete will, but, by means of a contrast based on the imperfection or incompleteness of the finite, an outlining in conception of a perfect or complete finite. Thus we have not escaped from the personal.

Period II.

CHAPTER IV.

Exposition.

I.

In 'The Conception of God', the Supplementary Essay is Royce's answer to the question on individuation. Then in the Gifford Lectures, he gives in complete form his whole metaphysical position.

The difference between pure or abstract thinking and concrete thinking or 'Thought' lies in the Will or Purpose.¹ Pure reflection presents no mystery. In Will one passes beyond the merely conceptual or the contemplative. Will is active and involves other elements than reflection.² It is not irrational. Yet it may not make explicit its implicit reasons. So the kernel of individuality is Will. Or better, the organizing, individuating principle is Will. "The satisfied Will, as such, is the sole Principle of Individuation."³ "Experience always determines the infinite universals of thought to concrete individual examples. Thought, on the other hand, even when it defines the contents of experience, always does so by viewing them as individual cases of an infinite series of possible cases."⁴ "In this sense, the individuality, the concrete reality, of the contents of the Absolute Experience, must be conceived as, on the one hand, fulfilling ideas, but as on the other hand freely, unconstrainedly,—if you will, *capriciously*,—embodying their universality in the very fact of the presence of this life, this experience, this world."⁵

The reality of the Absolute is demonstrated in the Roycean way, by a consideration of the relation of thought and its object in connection with realistic theories. The 'independence'

1. In Munsterberg's "Grundzuge der Psychologie" pp. 44-45, it is held that the decisive step in the mutual contact in experiencing our fellow men, is in the will rather than in the intellect.
2. G. K. Chesterton has noted this when he tells us that it is idle to argue with the choice of the soul.
3. "The World and the Individual" vol. I, p. 586.
4. "The Conception of God" p. 194. 5. Ibid. p. 203. 6. Ibid. p. 178. 7. Ibid. p. 186 f. (Italics are mine).

and the 'relation' of the objects 'beyond' indicate the larger and inclusive experience where thought is adequate to the object; "a Unity not bound to the limitations of our own flow of successive and numerically separate experiences, although inclusive, both of this flow, and of these various experiences themselves,—in their very fragmentariness,—but also in their relationships."⁶ 'Omniscience' or 'Thought' is the best term "to define the Absolute."⁷ But the purely theoretical definition must be completed. He prepares for this completion by an examination of the nature of finite Will.

Will involves "Desire, Choice, and Efficacious Effort."⁸ Desire alone may be capricious, though desire is at the root of will. "Unless I first desire, I shall never get any of the more complex and rational processes of the will."⁹ Choice is a more rational level, but may remain only a mental process. It calls logically for effective expression. This expression may be estimated in kinesthesia only. Will involves a higher element. It is "Attention."¹⁰ Our voluntary processes are, in all their grades, selective rather than inventive. Consciousness has a focus and to direct the focus upon some part of the field of vision is to cause that spot to come out more clearly and the rest to sink into obscurity. Attention is selective and, in its selection, the limitless possibilities of fulfilment of the idea pass away as the one concrete choice is made. This significant choice is in the finite ever less than complete. But the direction of will is evident. The limitless or endless conceptual possibilities become embodied in the one concrete. It is a limitation in the abstract but a distinct expansion in the concrete. "Experience always determines the infinite universals of thought to concrete individual examples."¹¹

This conception of the will, filled out logically, implies that while we may abstractly think of the ideas of the Absolute as having infinite possibilities of embodiment; yet there is an Absolute "Arrest" of such possibilities. The one world embodies fully the ideas of the Absolute. Our embodiment of ideas never attains this absolute arrest. In the case of the Absolute, further conceptual possibilities are absolutely unreal. Just why the one world *must* thus realise fully the ideas of the Absolute, we cannot know. There is here to the spectator the

8. The Conception of God, p. 187. 9. Ibid. p. 187. 10. Ibid. p. 191.

presence of 'caprice'.¹² The caprice lies in this, that the act of the will as a mental process is hidden from the onlooker.

This embodiment is "an organized, significant, purposeful, or teleological, worthy perfect whole of fact."¹³ "The Will individuates according to its own needs; and if it needs, for its fulfilment, free individuals, it will possess them."¹⁴ The Universal Will thus individuates a world of free individuals.¹⁵ This initial or eternal individuation shows its presence in the finite individual in his will. He is a free individual.

This ability of the finite selves to have interests which are focussed,—exclusive interests,—is that which individuates individuals in the time-experience. In developing aims, objects or ideals, we are out of the chaos of more primitive levels of life. We are making ourselves significant individuals. "It is by an individuating or exclusive interest in living one life, for one purpose, that a man becomes a moral individual, one self, and not a mere collection of empirical social contrast effects."¹⁶ We are real as we are thus individuated. To be individual is to "be unique."¹⁷

Now while the world of individuals has been individuated, not by the thought but by the Love, Interest, and Will of the Absolute, yet "Divine Omniscience is fulfilled in the world which Divine Love individuates."¹⁸ Thus "individuality, in such a world would neither be absorbed in one indistinct whole nor yet be opaque fact, for the exclusive Love of the Absolute for this world would render the individuality of the fact secondarily intelligible as being the fulfilment of the very exclusiveness of the love."¹⁹ In this original endowment of individuality conferred by the Absolute, the individual has his distinctiveness.²⁰

11. *The Conception of God*, p. 212. 12. *Ibid.* p. 202. 13. *Ibid.* p. 210.

14. "The Conception of God" p. 271.

15. This view puts central significance in God's Will or Purpose in the initial "sundering" of himself. An argument which seems to have influenced Prof. Royce to make this change of emphasis on the element of Will is found in the criticism by Prof. Le Conte (see "The Conception of God" p. 76 f.) Taking Thought in the sense of thought, reflective, contemplative, 'powerless', he sees no explanation of why this particular sort of world is the embodiment of that thought. He gives his evolutionary conception of God's purpose. Divine Energy has sundered itself in order to have something to contemplate and ultimately to love. This sundered Divine Energy, the immanence of God in nature, rises through various levels until in man, in self-consciousness, there is the birth into the spiritual world, where man holds communion with Deity.

16. "The Conception of God" p. 265.

17. "The Conception of God" p. 268. 18. *Ibid.* p. 259. 19. *Ibid.* p. 266.

20. Though will is rooted in desire and, in untutored nature, is liable to all sorts of whims and caprices, yet, in the will of the intelligent, the caprice is not of this sort. It is the unpredictable expression of a free being. It is necessary to note that the highest in man is thus linked back to the desires which, untutored, give 'anarchy'. In the true individual, desire is not extirpated but put in its proper place.

It is not then just as 'thinker' that the finite individual is the image of the whole. "The Absolute individuates the lives of A and B by virtue of interests, of forms of will and of self-consciousness, which are different for A and B."²¹ Such individuation is not a mere fiat but appears in the development of individual will. "The individuating will of any person, as this person, is expressed from moment to moment, in his more or less conscious intention to view his life as a struggle towards, and consequently as in contrast with, his ideal goal."²² The Absolute Will, in individuating a will, has not predetermined in the physical sense the temporal sequence of its acts.²³

II.

Having made definite his conception that the world-primary is Purpose or Will, Royce gives us in the Gifford Lectures a full system of metaphysics on this basis.

The Absolute is the "Individual of Individuals" and "the satisfied Will, as such, is the sole Principle of Individuation."²⁴

Royce approaches the problem of the nature of reality through the medium of ideas. His first question is not, What is reality ? but "What is an Idea ? and How can Ideas stand in any true relation to reality?"²⁵ To start with reality makes failure certain. "Begin by accepting..... the mere brute reality of the world as fact, and there you are, sunk in an ocean of mysteries..... The world as fact now bewilders you.. . . . by a chaos of unintelligible fragments and of scattered events; now it lifts up your heart with wondrous glimpses of ineffable goodness, and now it arouses your wrath by frightful signs of cruelty and baseness." It is a "defiant mystery..... persistently baffling, unless we find somewhere the key to it."²⁶

We must "assert the primacy of the world as Idea over the World as Fact," and "deal with the problem of reality from the side of the means through which we are supposed to be able to attain reality, that is, from the side of Ideas." "What then is an Idea ? and how can an Idea be related to Reality ?"²⁷

21. "The Conception of God" p. 312. 22. Ibid. p. 316. 23. Ibid. p. 317.

24. "The World and the Individual" vol. I, pp. 40 and 586.

25. "The World and the Individual" I, p. 16. 26. Ibid. I, pp. 17, 18. 27. Ibid. I, p. 19.

The essence of an idea does not consist in representing a fact existent beyond itself. This is the ordinary view. Its primary and inner character does not lie in the objective reference, in that it images or symbolizes or in any other way indicates external facts or events. Ideas express the active side of life rather than the receptive or sensory. The elements constituting our ideas have been selected under the guidance of a purpose. It is the voluntary purpose that organizes the elements of an idea into a unity as well as chooses them. Ideas are primarily 'plans of action' and represent intentions. "Ideas have the significance of an act of will." In brief an idea is "any state of consciousness whether simple or complex, which, when present, is then and there viewed as at least the partial expression or embodiment of a single conscious purpose."²⁸ A pen is really defined by its use. The intrinsic meaning of it flows from the purpose of an agent.

Ideas are secondarily representative of objects. This 'external' or objective meaning would seem to be the one of most significance. Validity and value as truth cannot belong to an idea through conformity with a mere purpose. It must indicate the nature of an object. However, much voluntary selection may operate in the constitution and arrangement of the contents of an idea, the function of the idea is to express the truth and to conform to facts. And facts are stubborn and, at least on the surface, indifferent to the purposes and intentions of individuals. Indeed, the value of an idea as a vehicle of objective truth seems to be destroyed just in the degree to which it is observed to be subservient to an individual's will. It would seem, therefore, that the purpose with which we form our conceptions of objects is not relevant to their truth. Our knowledge must conform to facts, not the facts to our desires; and in this respect there is the strongest contrast between the 'intrinsic meaning' and the objective reference of an idea.

This is the "world-knot"²⁹ and is a contrast which Royce would heighten. But he would reduce it by reducing the external meaning, qua external, into mere appearance; and then representing it as an aspect of the internal meaning. The external meaning is simply the internal meaning imperfectly understood. "Our final result will simply reabsorb the secondary

28. "The World and the Individual, I, pp. 22, 23. 29. Ibid. I, p. 35. 30. Ibid. I,

aspect, the external meaning, into the completed primary aspect,—the completely embodied internal meaning of the idea. The final meaning of every complete idea, when fully embodied, must be viewed as wholly an internal meaning.”³⁰

If to the ordinary human consciousness objects appear to be independent of man’s purposes, and to determine his ideas for him, that arises simply from his imperfect comprehension of what both his will and objects mean. The more fully he interprets them, that is to say, the more intelligent his purpose becomes, and the better he comprehends objects, the more the purpose and the facts will be found to approach one another. “I shall not only imitate my object as another and correspond to it from without. I shall become one with it, and so internally possess it.” “The real world is just our whole will embodied.”³¹

But we only partially know our own will, and, in consequence, we find it obstructed by that which appears to be entirely foreign and other to us, by ‘brute facts’. But the process of comprehending facts strips them of their otherness, explains away their indifference, and foreignness, brings them into our own intelligent lives, makes them part of our living experience, and constitutes them into expressions of our conscious purpose. And, on the other hand, the process explaining the world as our “embodied purpose” is the process of explicating the implicit significance of our own will, till at last we find it is co-extensive with real being. “Our theory will identify ignorance of reality with finite vagueness of meaning, will assert that the very absolute, in its fulness of life, is even now the object that you really mean by your fragmentary passing ideas, and that the defect of your present human form of consciousness lies in the fact that you just now do not know precisely what you mean.”³²

Now this absorption of the external meaning of ideas in the internal meaning is to do away with the distinction between external objects and conscious volitions, and to represent the world of reality simply as the expression of an intelligent will. Further to represent the ‘real world as just our whole will embodied’ is to identify man with the Absolute, and to make his finitude a mere appearance, an accident due to his ignor-

ance. It may be an appearance from which he can never entirely free himself, for he may be endlessly engaged in overcoming this ignorance, to which the contrast between inner and outer is due. Yet his destiny, were it fulfilled, is to "face Being", to "become one with it, and so internally to possess it"³³. This identification of the world with man's will and man's will with the Absolute is the very means of securing the individuality, the unique personal existence of both man and God. God is the "Individual of Individuals."³⁴ And seeing that man is will, his individual rational life, in the process of comprehending the world more and more fully, ever deepens within itself into greater inner determinateness and unity with itself. He becomes free of the whole world, for the whole world is his own, and the enactment of his personal intelligent will. This man's action is "as unique as is the whole divine life, as free as is the whole meaning of which the world is an expression." It is one with the divine life. "When I thus consciously and uniquely will, it is I, then, who just here am God's will."³⁵

Ibid. I, p. 40. 35. Ibid. I, pp. 468, 469.

CHAPTER V.

Critical.

I.

With Will as the principle of individuation there is a difficulty similar to that where thought was held to be the principle. "A will, or a purpose, can never be the whole of the world. A purpose always means that, founding yourself on matter accepted as a basis, you recognize a certain alteration as essential, in view of the admitted situation, for the restoration or partial restoration of harmony."¹ Such at least is finite purpose. It is "a partial phenomenon within a totality." All processes of will imply the contrast between existence as it comes to us in the here and now of actual feeling, and existence as it should be. and as we seek to make it, for the satisfaction of our various impulses, cravings and desires. In an experience where the aspects of ideality and real existence are once for all finally united, thought completed, will fulfilled or embodied, we are giving to 'will' and 'thought' meanings not in ordinary usage.² We have obscurity then in Will as the principle of individuation. The logical demonstration of Will as completely satisfied and fulfilled is based on facts of finite experience. Yet a finished world is not in accord with the nature of will³ as we know it.

Will in the finite has still another phase. Not only do we regard will as in process of embodying itself, but as purpose, in its exact definition, we think of will as growing more definite

1. Bosanquet "The Principle of Individuality and Value", p. 391. See also A. E. Taylor, "Elements of Metaphysics" p. 410 f.
2. In Spinoza's Ethics I, 17. Sch. we read, "If intellect and volition belong to the eternal essence of God each of these attributes must differ *toto caelo* from our will and intellect." See also F. H. Bradley, "Truth and Reality" 96 f. "Will must imply something in the self, or beyond the self, which is other than will and apart from this 'other' I cannot find any sense or meaning in the 'will' either of man or God." See also p. 350 note.
3. Prof. Howison sees danger in basing will in any sense on desire, or of finding its roots in desire (see The Conception of God, p. 187 f. Royce's dialectic of Will). He thinks such a relation opens the door to possible anarchy (see Report of the Philosophical Association for 1915, in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method, Feb. 17th, 1916, p. 99). He would find the basis of origination in man in "rational self-activity." (The Conception of God, p. 321. Ed. note). Will is not indeterminate in any direction. Selective attention is motivated. Howison believes we are forced back in search of cognitive grounds of choice. Royce would acknowledge the presence of other influences than the purely cognitive. Desire and instinct are present

and adequate. The 'Arrest' we find in will is not so much that which absolutely precludes all other embodiment but that arrest which perfect definition gives to the purpose. Might we not think of the Absolute as a fully defined Purpose, existing not as a mere ideal but as being embodied is an infinitely unfinished world?⁴ Part II. will deal more fully with this point.

II.

As noted in the criticism of Period I, a "completed experience" leaves no real place for free individuals. While Thought individuated the world, the finite was still capable of valid thinking. As reflection it was 'powerless' and indeed sought no power.

But if Will individuates the world and embodies itself completely, there is no room for real will in the finite. "Whoever is possessed of any meaning, whoever faces truth, whoever rationally knows, has before his consciousness at once, that which possesses the unity of a knowing process, and that which fulfils a purpose, or in other words, that which constitutes what we have from the outset called an act of will as well as an act of knowledge."⁵ Does this mean more than getting a clearly defined thought, ideal or purpose before the mind? If it implies an active effort to embody the will, then in a 'closed universe' such effort⁶ is unaccounted for and its results are negligible and temporal replicas of the eternal realities.

III.

With regard to the finite as 'part' we are no further ahead than in the earlier period. Neglecting there the doctrine of

Bosanquet (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 113 f.) takes the ground that if observation and experience of our formed individual character are adequate one can predict the expression of will. Royce would say, I think, that if one had the complete situation one might predict. There seems no clear cut line between 'rational self-activity' and less rational stages in mental development. Royce is urging for the expression in will of the whole personality.

4 Prof. James in his Essay, "The Dilemma of Determinism" (*The Will to Believe*, p. 181) has compared our relation to the universe to that of the unskilled player and the skilled one. The latter knows not ahead the moves of the opponent, but he knows he himself will win.

5 *The World and the Individual I*, 433 f.

6 James Seth in a review of "The Conception of God" in the *Philosophical Review* (1898) p. 312, says "Will is after all only 'appearance' in man, its reality is the Will of God."

the closed universe, it was noted that the finite could *know* his relation as a 'part' of the whole, and could *know* that the whole is the expression of a Universal Will. As a 'part' of this Will, the activity in time open to the part was to return to the whole from which it had been individuated. This doctrine of duty seemed a doctrine of self-alienation.

In this second period the position is unchanged.⁷ "In all this my own struggle with evil, wherein lies my comfort? I answer, my true comfort can never lie in my temporal attainment of my goal. For it is my first business, as a moral agent, and as a servant of God, to set before myself a goal that, in time, simply cannot be attained. Wherein can comfort truly be found? I reply. In the consciousness, first, that the ideal sorrows of our finitude are identically God's own sorrows and in the assurance, secondly, that God's fulfilment in the eternal order is to be won through the very bitterness of tribulation through this, my tribulation."⁸ In this my attitude there is resignation, acceptance rather than any active control. I am loyal to the Universal Will even if I do not comprehend it.⁹

7 On this point see W. E. Hocking, "The Meaning of God in Human Experience" p. 498 f. "It seems to me that Royce has brought this principle of altruism to its philosophic fulfilment."

8 The World and the Individual, pp. 407, 408.

9 This point is dealt with fully in Part II.

Period III.

CHAPTER VI.

Exposition.

I

In 'The Philosophy of Loyalty' (1907) we have Royce's first attempt to deal directly with the question of ethics since¹ his first book. The latter dealt with the subject only in outline with the ulterior aim of showing the implication, in the 'moral demand', of a Universal Will. This later book is a more complete dealing with the ethical ideal. The earlier work carried the implication that the social was a somewhat temporary² means of awakening in a man the recognition of his true relation to the Absolute. This later book develops the question of man's relations to man. It proves to be more than a temporary or temporal phase.. The social is the real. It is a matter of indifference whether we view Reality as the Absolute or as the Community.³ In the earlier work, "independence is a temporary means, whose ultimate aim is harmony and unity of all men on a higher plane."⁴ In the third period the social is eternal and hence distinctiveness is not merely temporal. In the earlier work the finite individual is temporal and derived. In the last work the individual is eternal and undervived.⁵

In the second period the individual is eternal and derived. Immortality is ascribed to the individual. But its statement is not unambiguous. While the "moral ego really is unfulfilled"⁶ individuality persists as a "finite life" in time. Attaining the goal *in time* means the *end*. So immortality means a goal ever unattained. But on the other hand the aim is *eternally* attained. Immortality as a doctrine presents these two aspects. "Temporal categories are wholly inadequate to ex-

1 See the Philosophy of Loyalty, p. ix.

2 See The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 478. "We know nothing about personal immortality." See also 440.

3 See the Problem of Christianity, I, pp. xxxvi, 409, II, 11.

4 The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 216.

5 If we choose as alternative "the Divine Community".

press the ultimate facts of life.”⁷ We have here an unmediated contrast between time and eternity.

This position is restated in *The World and the Individual*.⁸ “In Eternity all is done, and we too rest from our labors. In Time there is no end to the individual ethical task.” We are assured that “Philosophy here supports tradition. This is a moral world. All moral battles get fought out. All quests are fulfilled. The goal—yes, your individual goal—is by you yourself attained in the eternal life. You, yourself, and not merely another, consciously know in the eternal world the attainment of that goal.”⁹ This oscillation between ‘eternal’ and ‘temporal’ leaves the matter ambiguous. I find it impossible to make Royce’s meaning clear to myself. I can but accept his word that “this Eternal Now is simply not the temporal present.”¹⁰

It appears it is necessary to see that “the true distinction and the true connection, between the temporal and the eternal aspects of Being, furnish, in truth, the basis for a solution of this whole problem.”¹¹ Yet the distinction and connection are *not* made clear. One welcomes then the chance of escape from these dark sayings as offered in the position of the third period. Here we may regard the ultimate as ‘the Divine Community’¹² and hence the need is gone of seeking to hold together two such incommensurables as ‘temporal’ and ‘eternal’.

In the earlier work we read “the moral insight, insisting upon the need of the harmony of all human wills, shows us that, whatever the highest human good may be, we can only attain it together, for it involves harmony Either the highest good is for man unattainable, or the humanity of the future must get it in common. Therefore the sense of community, the power to work together, with clear insight into our reasons for so working, is the first need of humanity Extend the moral insight among men.”¹³ “This extension of the moral insight is best furthered by devotion to our individual vocations, coupled with strict loyalty to the relations upon which society is founded.”¹⁴ This sense of community, as

6 *The Conception of God*, p. 323 f. *Ibid.* p. 326.

8 *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 444 f.

9 *The Conception of God*, p. 326. 10. *Ibid.* p. 348.

11 *The World and the Individual*, II, 347.

12 See *The Problem of Christianity*, I, pp. xxxvi, 409; II, p. 11.

13 *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 275. 14. *Ibid.* p. 473. See also p. V.

conscious, while coming later than a conscious sense of separateness, is more fundamental. In this earlier period the relation of separateness and community is temporal only and the former is produced only to be resigned for the latter. In the latest period distinctiveness and community are co-eternal.

In the first period the Absolute is One Will appearing in the temporal order as many wills. In the second the many persist in some sense as immortal. In the oscillation between the temporal and the eternal, it is not clear whether the individual has some form of temporal existence after the death of the body. If it has reached the *end* and yet, while no longer *temporal*, has an *eternal* form of persistence, then the fact can be stated only. What that 'eternal' is you cannot know "in so far as you remain on this shoal of time."¹⁵ Are we not given a contrast here instead of logic? In the third period along with the older Absolutism we have an alternative position offered us. The unity and plurality are co-eternal. Just how the unity remains as uniquely individual as in the earlier periods is not made clear.¹⁶ Unity and plurality are, at any rate, two aspects of the same reality. Here we seem to escape, through the alternative, from the obscurities of the eternal derivation of the individual. If plurality is ultimate then individuals are ultimate and hence underived. "A community immediately presents itself to our minds, both as one and as many and unless it is both one and many it is no community at all."¹⁷ We have then in this alternative position only that individuation which consists in the development of the individual as ultimate. And individuation in time is still mediated through the individual consciousness.¹⁸

II.

In this later period we have monism and pluralism rather externally joined together. A general impression is that Royce has retreated from his extreme Absolutism. But we have a clear attempt to unite that extreme position to his later empha-

Also *The Conception of God*, pp 278 f., 320 f.

15 *The Conception of God*, p. 326.

16 The attempt is made by the ascription to family, social or other higher unities of an individuality more concrete than is that of the individual man. Even a crowd has a 'mind.' It is impossible to locate this mind except in the individuals. 'Public spirit' is a figurative expression. Only citizens as individuals possess it.

17 *The Problem of Christianity*, II, p 17.

sis on the individual as social. And the attempt results in his usual oscillation.

The individual, as we have just noticed, exercises his own initiative in choice. Yet he is social. Now we have at times these social unities, in which man is found, regarded as ideal.¹⁹ This still leaves the individual as the maker of his own destiny. Then we have them drawn out before us as over-individuals, with minds, etc. Just how the freedom of the individual is preserved here²⁰ is obscure. We are told that "we all of us

believe that there is any real world simply because we find ourselves in a situation in which, because of the fragmentary and dissatisfying conflicts, antitheses, and problems of our present ideas, an interpretation of this situation is needed, but is not now known to us. By the 'real world' we mean simply the 'true interpretation of this our problematic situation. No other reason can be given than this for believing that there is any real world at all.'²¹ Yet we read "a community, when unified by an active indwelling purpose, is an entity more concrete, and, in fact less mysterious than is any individual man and that such a community can love and be loved as a husband and wife love; or as father or mother love."²² A "corporate entity is something more concrete than is the individual fellow man."²³ Or "if, by person, you mean a live unity of knowledge and of will, of love and of deed,—then the community of the Kingdom of Heaven is a person on a higher level than is the level of any human individual."²⁴ Just how such entities are more *concrete* than the individuals in whose consciousness they appear as *ideals* seems obscure. If the community has such concrete existence and is endowed with mind and will, then supreme power over its members is the logical conclusion.

18 See The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 470..

Also The Problem of Christianity, II. p. 60.

19 See Ibid. II, p. 79, it is a "consciousness of Unity" and "a common life in time."

See also II, p. 88, II, 264.

20. Prof. Dewey in his book on "German Philosophy and Politics" shows that Prussia has taken literally this over-individuality and hence ascribes to the State supreme power over the citizen. When Royce is emphasizing the more monistic side of his position he seems open to Dewey's criticisms.

21 The Problem of Christianity, II, p. 264 f. 22. Ibid. I, p. 95. 23. Ibid. I, p. 94. See I, 64, where he cites Wundt approvingly as saying that organized communities are psychical entities. Or I, 62, "a community is a sort of live unit, that has organs, as the body of an individual has organs.....it has a mind of its own."

The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 313. The Absolute is viewed as "one unity of consciousness, wherein countless unities are synthesized." o.c. p. 310 "Our Social organization as personal unities of consciousness." o.c. p. 311. From this point of view we are, and we have our worth, by virtue of our relation to a consciousness of a type superior to the human type." See also The Sources of Religious Insight, p. 201.

24 The Problem of Christianity, I, 352.

This *unmediated* relation between community and unity holds throughout and as the unity intended has been found unsatisfactory in the discussion of the earlier periods, one can exercise the privilege of choice and select that view which is more just to the individual since such is our starting point. If man is social in his essential nature both temporally and eternally, there need be no such *concrete* and unitary personal mind inclusive of his.

We shall count these communities as spiritual, and more *ideal* yet than actual, and based in the essentially social nature of men. In the first period all are to use personal choice in deciding to "act as one being."²⁵ Here we surely have an ideal or a formal principle. This choice is exercised only in the temporal since immortality is not known.. In the last period the choice of ideals is a permanent feature of individual life. The individuality of the 'part' persists, since community as such is ultimate and eternal.

III.

Choosing this alternative position, individuation is the problem of developing the potential. It is a social potential. We realize it in the service of 'causes'. The 'highest' ideal of life is to be "loyal not for the sake of the good that we privately get out of loyalty, but for the sake of the good of the cause,—this higher unity of experience,—gets out of this loyalty."²⁶ This conceiving of a gulf between any true self-satisfaction and a disinterested service of a cause is an abstraction and is evidence of that one-sidedness in ethical theory which I have called self-alienation. It does not seem to be a necessary feature of the life of the individual in the community.. This seems to me to emphaize the persistent variety of interests and aims rather than the monotony of an ultimate unit of aim and purpose. This self-alienation as discussed in connection with the first period, seems to me a view foisted on the individual by the necessities of an Absolutism not really found in finite experience. Here also in the third period in spite of the alternative offered between Monism and Pluralism, the monistic ethical ideal is present.

This is the highest ideal since, "I, myself am a fragmentary conscious life that is included within the conscious conspectus

²⁵ The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 193.

²⁶ The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 312.

of the world's experience, and that is in one self-conscious unity with that world-consciousness."²⁷ I am to find my highest life in "a practical service of superhuman objects."²⁸ This service is *ever* one which I personally am to choose. Hence "the unity of the world is not an ocean in which we are lost but a *life* which is and which *needs* all our lives in *one*."²⁹ Here we have a juxta-position of the concrete and the ideal. The '*life is*' and yet needs our efforts.

Our task as free individuals in this higher unity is to become individuals. The meaning of life comes in some degree at first, "through some authority external to our wills"³⁰ and ever "in so far as our moral training is incomplete, the moral law may at any moment have to assume afresh this air of external authority merely in order to win our due attention."³¹ The truly right or wrong act, however, calls for the activity of conscience in the individual himself. "My duty is simply my own will brought to my clear self-consciousness."³²

Now "by nature, apart from any specific training, I have no personal will of my own."³³ "Plans of life come to us in connection with our endless imitative activities"³⁴ which are however never merely imitative for "conformity attracts but also wearies us."³⁵ But "social conformity gives us social power."³⁶ Thus, in interaction, one comes to consciousness of who and what he is. One is actually individuated in the growth in the individual of the sense of individuality and its power of service.

This individuation, marking man's social dependence or interdependence, is indicative of the direction of his true life. I do not give up my will but my highest achievement is to choose freely and with personal satisfaction the will of the higher unity. The patriot is one who "has no will but that of the country."³⁷ This personal choice of impersonal ends or loyalty "reverberating all through you, stirring you to your

27 The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 396 f. 28. Ibid. p. 374. See also "The Sources of Religious Insight" p. 200.

29 The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 394. Italics are mine. 30. Ibid p. 24.

31 The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 25. 32. Ibid. p. 25. 33. Ibid. p. 31. 34. Ibid. p. 32. 35. Ibid. p. 34. 36. Ibid. p. 35. 37. Ibid. p. 41. See also Sources of Religious Insight, p. 201.

One may note here the change in phraseology (if not in meaning) from the earliest book. In The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (pp. 210-212) much is made of 'impersonal' aims and ideals. Here the choice of one's service is ever a 'personal' one. (See the Philosophy of Loyalty, pp. 18 f., 20, 52, 79, 384) p. 20 'The cause. . . . is never something wholly impersonal. It concerns other men.' The difference seems verbal. The 'personal' choice to be impersonal seems to me to be a self-contradiction.

depths, first unifies your plan of life, and thereby gives you what nothing else can give,—yourself as lived in accordance with a plan, your consciousness as your plan interpreted for you through your ideal, your cause expressed as your personal purpose in living.”³⁸ This loyalty which individuates us as selves is “the will to manifest the eternal in and through the deeds of individual selves.”³⁹ In loyalty to a cause is found that which not only individuates the life of any person in furnishing him with a task, but which brings him to full moral self-consciousness. My consciousness is my ideal and vice versa.

Now the causes of men will vary. Our tasks may even seem to clash. I must be loyal not so much to the cause of another which clashes with my own but to my fellow’s spirit of loyalty. Thus the principle that individuates men may be stated in its most general form as “loyalty to loyalty”. Under the leading of this spirit, we will be guided towards harmony and peace and a true communal life.

Thus Royce has sought to place, metaphysically, the moral life of man. Individuals temporally construct social organizations and institutions, because eternally they are social. The ‘city of God’ is being let down out of Heaven.⁴⁰ The sense of individual separateness is the negative side of a positive community of nature. An isolated individual is non-existent. The gap, which thought makes at times between individuals, is seen as only real for thought. Our consciousness is social and it is in social communion that the uniqueness of self-identity is attained. In defining his own plan and purpose within the unity of the communal mind, a man attains what degree of distinctiveness is his. The basic purpose of us all is thus, making our purposes definite, to cooperate with our fellows in the pursuit of common aims.

IV.

In the Philosophy of Loyalty, the principle for guidance in moral conduct, is the principle of “loyalty to loyalty”. If the individual feels that the direction ‘to be loyal to a cause’

38. *The Philosophy of Loyalty* pp. 384. 39. *Ibid.* p. 377. See also *Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 206.

40. See *Revelation* 21/2.

gives little more counsel than a rule to be conscientious, the interpretation given 'loyalty to a cause' in the concluding chapters of the book and in "The Problem of Christianity" seems much more adequate. The ethical rule is made definitely metaphysical. Loyalty does not work in a vacuum, but in the concrete world. Here causes are found. A cause is the appearance in the time-process of a unity of life, wider or larger than the individual person.. These causes, if not fully actual in the time-process, are being realized there. So then "by Loyalty is meant the thorough-going and loving devotion of an individual to a community"⁴¹ and such a view presents logically the problem "whether the whole universe is or is not, in some sense, both a community and a divine being."⁴²

The idea of the community, suggested by the problems of human social life, is an illustration of the possible solution of the problem of the One and the Many and hence of the quarrels of Monism and Pluralism.⁴³ To Royce, in this latest period, it seems a matter of indifference whether one calls final reality, the Absolute or the Divine Community.⁴⁴ "Man the community without ceasing to be genuinely human, may also prove to be divine Man the community may prove to be God."⁴⁵

These communities are true individuals. "A crowd. has a mind, but no institutions, no organization, no coherent unity, no history, no traditions."⁴⁶ Add these latter features and you have a community, for "a true community is essentially a product of a time-process."⁴⁷ This is illustrated by the 'familiar analogy' from individual life. "The self comes down to us from its own past. It needs and is a history."⁴⁸ "My idea of myself is an interpretation of my past, linked with an interpretation of my hopes and intentions as to my future."⁴⁹ If I extend my past, my life tends to merge with the lives of my kindred⁵⁰ and with my race. If I extend my hopes into the future, I find a corresponding Community of Hope. The ultimate unity of all would be the Absolute.⁵¹

The analogy of the finite, with his power of extending "his life in ideal fashion, so as to regard it as including past and future events which lie far away in time, and which he does now personally remember,"⁵² is used to illustrate the meaning

41. *The Problem of Christianity*, vol. I, p. XXXVII. 42. *Ibid.* vol I, p. XXXVI.
43. *Ibid.* vol. II, p. 17. 44. *Ibid.* II, p. 11, 17, 220, 296. 45. *Ibid.* I, 408 f.
46. *Ibid.* II, 36 f. 47. *Ibid.* II, 37. 48. *Ibid.* II, 40. 49. *Ibid.* II, 42.
50. *Ibid.* II, 64. 51. *Ibid.* II, 46 f. The Absolute is implied in the unity of the two men in the canoe. 52. *Ibid.* vol. II, p. 60 f.

of the 'Community'. It is a genuine unity of many, a social unity with a history and with ideals for the future..

"Motives which are as familiar as they are hard to analyse have convinced us all, before we begin to philosophise, that our human world contains a variety of individually distinct minds or selves, and that some, for us decisively authoritative, principle of individuation keeps these selves apart."⁵³ Here is 'stubborn pluralism'. It points to the "diversity and the separateness of our streams of immediate feeling"⁵⁴ or notes "that our trains of conscious thought and purpose are mutually inaccessible through any mode of direct intuition"⁵⁵ or refers to "our deeds". Are we not ultimately separate? Yet "primitive man is not an individualist"⁵⁶ even though he gains distinctiveness as he emerges from the primitive.

Monism would indicate a more fundamental unity in that "social cooperation unquestionably brings into existence languages, customs, religions."⁵⁷ The facts of social and state life indicate that "large and small bodies of men can come to act as if one common intelligence and one common will were using the individuals as its almost helpless instruments."⁵⁸ In actual social life "the close shut-in streams of consciousness appear as if they had lost their banks altogether."⁵⁹ The 'Community', as not only the larger inclusive present, but as also the great past and the future, holds within itself the individuals in spite of or through their separateness. So the Divine Community is that invisible world which holds us all.

The problem of individuation is not then to note the points of separation as if the individual could be defined negatively by what he excluded or was not. "My life means nothing, either theoretically or practically, unless I am a member of a community. I win no success worth having unless it is also the success of the community to which I essentially and by virtue of my real relations to the whole universe belong. My deeds are not done at all, unless they are indeed done for all time and are irrevocable."⁶⁰ The community gives this historical fixity and continuity. The lesser unites or communities are all fixed in the supreme unity or community. Here the 'credit values' of postulates and hypotheses have their 'redeemers' 'laid

53. *Ibid.* vol II, p. 18. 54. *Ibid.* vol. II, 20 f. 55. *Ibid.* vol. II, 23 f.

56. *Ibid.* vol. II, 25. 57. *Ibid.* vol. II, p. 26. 58. *Ibid.* vol. II, p. 27 f.

59. *Ibid.* vol. II, 28.

60. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 313.

up in a realm where our experiences past, present, future, are the objects of a conspectus that is not merely temporal and transient"⁶¹ for "the temporal world in its wholeness, constitutes in itself an infinitely complex Sign. This sign is, as a whole, interpreted to an experience which itself includes a synoptic survey of the whole of time."⁶²

If now I am, more or less potentially, a member of a community how am I individuated as such a member? I am a self in being "a life whose unity and connectedness depends upon some sort of interpretations of plans, of memories, of hopes and of deeds."⁶³ "The word 'interpretation' is a convenient name for a process which at least aims to be cognitive."⁶⁴ "There is no direct intuition or perception of the self"⁶⁵ but "one discovers one's own mind through a process of inference analogous to the very modes of inference which guide us in a social effort to interpret our neighbour's minds."⁶⁶ Even in my moments of reflection I am social for "reflection involves an interior conversation."⁶⁷ "Through the present self, the past is so interpreted that its counsel is conveyed to the future self."⁶⁸ Thus in my very cognition I show my social nature. I am a community, an image of the whole. This constitutes my individuation. In loyalty I serve the ultimate cause and become in myself an interpreter. Just as in the earliest periods bringing the Absolute to the facts, each finite self turns out to be, when fully viewed, the Absolute. So here the Community (though viewed also as less definitely a unit) is brought to the facts and each individual, as seen fully, is a community.⁶⁹

"Loyalty to a community of interpretation enters into all the other forms of true loyalty. No one who loves mankind can find a worthier and more significant way to express his love than by increasing and expressing among men the Will to Interpret."⁷⁰

The loyalty to a cause which is thus posited as the principle of individuation, if deepened from an ethical to a metaphysical reference, means a Loyalty to the Beloved Community. Each

61. *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 337.

62. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 286

63. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, p. 111. 64. *Ibid.* II, 129. 65. *Ibid.* II, 138.

66. *Ibid.* II, 138 f. 67. *Ibid.* II, 138. 68. *Ibid.* II, 144.

69. To view one's cognition as triadic and thus social and hence to ground the notion of man's social nature in this is to me an analogy but no more.

70. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 218. 71. *Ibid.* II, p. 215. See also the *Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 172.

one is then "ideally aiming at an ideal event,—the spiritual unity of our community"⁷¹ and in so doing becomes a significant individual.

The loyal individual in possessing the 'Will to Interpret' is an interpreter. That which viewed practically is loyalty, viewed cognitively is interpretation.

CHAPTER VII.

Critical.

I.

In this period, the principle of individuation, whether 'loyalty to a cause', 'loyalty to loyalty' or 'the will to interpret', is after all a merely *formal* conception. We are left with no canon of preference which will enable us to choose between competing causes each of which might by itself be regarded as good. Indeed we do not seem to be in the sphere of concrete situations where causes are real. 'Loyalty to loyalty' is "a noble virtue but unless we read into it all our virtues and our entire traditional morality, it remains too general and empty to be of any great theoretical and practical value."¹

To such a possible objection Royce has made the following answer. If our uncertainty is the choosing between causes to both of which one should be loyal, then the *deepened* conception of loyalty is to guide us. This is "loyalty to loyalty". We are to be loyal to loyalty in order to do what we can to produce a maximum of devoted service of causes, a maximum of fidelity, and of selves that choose and serve fitting objects of loyalty. But if I use the word 'fitting' I assume the distinction between good and bad causes. This is what a fundamental principle of morality should give. And so we are left still without any calculus of loyalties and apart from such calculus the distinction between good and evil is assumed simply from the views of common sense and that without any acknowledgment. Granted we are to be loyal and to promote loyalty. It is not loyalty that makes a cause good or bad. I want guidance in objective situations, not a mere maxim to be conscientious..

Without a doubt this "fixed principle of duty" is necessary in all morality. But the morality which is constituted by pure

1. F. Thilly. Review of "The Philosophy of Loyalty" in The Philosophical Review for 1908, p. 541 f. He holds that Royce deduces from the concept of loyalty exactly what he has put in and so has not got to the roots of human conduct. Loyalty is a general label for all the virtues and is not shown to be a principle (see The Philosophy of Loyalty, pp. 129 f., 139).

Loyalty is a morality that is yet in the stage of intention or theory. The loyalty of the official² to his conscience takes precedence over his loyalty to his chief. Here was a concrete or objective situation with certain values involved already. Loyalty said only, 'stick to your highest value.' It did not decide which. Gen. R. E. Lee had to choose between his loyalty to state rights and to the Union. The advice of 'loyalty' is³—study the whole situation and when choosing—choose with decision and, having placed one's hand to the plow, turn not back. When deciding between two good causes, the principle of loyalty "commands simply but imperatively that since I must serve, and since, at this critical moment, my only service must take the form of a choice between loyalties, I shall choose, even in my ignorance, what form my service is henceforth to take."⁴ The principle of choice is—choose! Having chosen I must not look back nor regret. "Decide, knowingly if you can, ignorantly if you must, but in any case decide and have no fear."⁵ And this is the guidance where loyalties conflict! "Indecision would of itself constitute a sort of decision." And it is better to act for one of the causes than to do nothing. Here we have no real dealing with a situation as objective. It is rather the subjective. Where further objective information is what is needed, we have the subjective maxim—Choose.⁶

In ethics we are seeking for some absolute rule or, if not absolute, something at least that comes to us with a note of authority. We find in practice that all particular rules are tentative, except the rule—'observe rule'. This is the "law that there shall be law" (Palmer). Loyalty to loyalty is of this absolute, subjective⁷ type. It is a fixed principle of duty rather than a guide in particular cases. The *real* criterion behind loyalty—the one involved not merely theoretically in the subject but in the object also in all truly objective situations—is the social unity, the kingdom of ends, a union of selves inspired by social ideals.

While this is so it is not a useless emphasis which we have here on loyalty. It is an absolute rule even if its absolutism does not seem to help much in actual situations. If we are object-minded and each actual situation in which we find ourselves is a subject-object situation, it is not altogether useless

2. *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, pp. 135-137. 3. *Ibid.* pp. 183-193. 4. *Ibid.* p. 189.5. *Ibid.* p. 189.

to see what the subject side implies. It is an 'anticipation of attainment' to view in vision the self as in all loyal and harmonious relation with his fellows. It will nerve his actual deeds to justice and equity to have this good will in intention. In this sense it is a guiding ideal, however blind⁸ it is in the details of accomplishment. But it is subjective and hence abstract though it "is never a merely pious wish".⁹ Other ethical theories seek some objective end, such as happiness, well-being, self-realization, at least some concrete¹⁰ ideal for action.

This 'retreat into the self' has a peculiar value from Royce's point of view. If loyalty is a formal principle, the "form" is significant. The subject is social in his true or full nature. To recognize always that one's good,—whatever it may be,—must be one which shall make or keep one a true member of the community, is to keep in mind a 'formal' idea which will have its effect socially. One is committed to the cause of 'good will among men'. But this loyalty, seen thus as ideal, is rather the primal individuation, the potential, than the actual becoming of a personality. This is wrought out in the objective situations of life. We are to face this process with the recognition that we are 'members one of another'. This is to be loyal, even to 'be loyal to loyalty.' It is the assertion of the *autonomy* of a *social* being. In any possible action I will be free. The choice is to be my own. It must be a unforced¹¹ loyalty to a cause that fascinates me. This cause I view beforehand as of necessity one of good will to all. But it is a prophecy of individuation rather than its attainment.

II.

Against loyalty as elaborated there seems a further criticism. It is essentially altruistic. Royce attacks the individualism of Nietzsche¹² whose 'will to power' he characterizes as "power idealized through its social efficacy, and conceived in terms of some more or less vague dream of a completely perfected and ideal, but certainly social, individual man." Despite this appreciative interpretation, Royce goes on to show the objections to "defining your personal good in terms merely of power."¹³ The attainment of power is so uncertain, the lust for it becomes

6. It would seem also that experimentally one should be prepared to look back and make changes if experience should suggest it.

insatiable, and it means increasing opportunity for conflict. But this seems to be giving 'power' a sort of animal or brute force meaning. If we read power in terms of mechanical skill, the magic of the orator, the art of the teacher, we see power in another form than the one akin to violence.. Even in the 'loyalty to loyalty' life, since I must act, I will be in danger of conflict. Royce challenges the individualist to set about the task. He would have him quit his 'preliminary gesticulations' and act. It seems to Royce an ideal with no content and surely if it means an exalting of the empty claim to self-hood over against the whole world of possible deeds and achievements, it is contentless. But have we not the same position if one gesticulates or talks of devotion to causes, and loyalty to loyalty? One might well say—Begin the life of loyalty or find the cause. In Royce's position there seems the exaltation of the 'cause'. The 'will to power' stirs up trouble with others. This is an objection to it. Loyalty to a cause will avoid this. Is it by the absence of self assertion? Have I the right in such a scheme to trust my own judgment about 'causes'? If so how can I convince one who has a rival cause that I am impartial, unbiased, and impersonal? Or if I avoid all setting up of my own judgment and accept that of another, am I not in danger of being classed as a mere partisan of another? In either event, I meet with trouble. It is not the 'will to power' alone that has warfare in its career.

Prof Royce's statements make much of such terms as 'fidelity', 'devotion', 'self-surrender'. He feels the "essentially irresistible forces of the whole universe"¹⁴ quoting Spinoza's "The power of man is infinitely surpassed by the power of external things." It seems an attitude of defence, rather than one of attack. The great inventions or creations are not won through a direct command of nature's laws. It is rather that knowledge of and obedience to nature's laws give powers of achievement not otherwise possessed. "Our creativity in any field

7. See W. E. Hocking "The Meaning of God in Human Experience" p. 195 ff. on the irrelevant universal and its value.

8. *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 186. 9. *Ibid.* pp. 185, 188.

10. See W. R. Sorley in the *Hibbert Journal*, vol. VII., No. I, in a review of "The Philosophy of Loyalty" in which he holds that this principle of loyalty is a merely formal one.

11. See *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, pp. 120, 131. 12. *Ibid.* pp. 4, 85, 98, 381, 382. *The Problem of Christianity*, I, p. 155.

13. "The Philosophy of Loyalty" pp. 87-89. 14. *Ibid.* p. 88.

15. W. E. Hocking "The Meaning of God in Human Experience" p. XVII.

16. *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, p. 93.

follows faithfully the character of our passivity in that same field, and varies with it not inversely but directly.”¹⁵ Burbank has exercised something of this power to create. The Nietzschean ‘will to be mighty’ may seem an “empty proclaiming of a moral sovereignty over your life”,¹⁶ but the emphasis on ‘devotion’ to causes seems to denature one on the other side. Even though there be the unforced and personal choice of a ‘cause’ that fascinates me, loyalty will tend to a minimum since it lacks the urge of the truly or fully personal. It will lack the full initiative which I submit cannot exist where one has ‘surrendered’ self. We are not held to a choice between a selfish¹⁷ and an altruistic life. One cannot unself oneself. The higher self, the fully personal, has its legitimate¹⁸ right to the sense of happiness and victory. Because the ruthless violent self demands such satisfaction, the demand in itself is not thereby wrong.

III.

Loyalty has been criticised as abstractly formal or subjective. It is submitted further that Interpretation, as a cognitive process, is not primary. It is concerned with predicates, with the ‘what’ of things, and hence it has no originating power over existential propositions. As every interpretation, including a theoretical first one, presumes the existence of the minds addressed by the interpreter, the belief in the existence of minds beyond my present self cannot be a product of interpretation.

It would seem then that in Interpretation, as cognitive, we have a stage or partial phase only of a developed individual life. It may reinforce the more primitive individuation but has not caused it. This more primitive individuation is that which has not only separated me as a discrete individual but has supplied that simpler and more direct or immediate knowledge of other mind, which the interpretative process takes up and elaborates. Interpretation, as cognitive, is the name for a certain stage or formation of the individuating process.

In the first two periods, Royce holds that in finite thought, ideally viewed, (not as concretely embodied) we have a true

17. In Aristotle's *Ethics* Book IX, Ch. VIII., this point is discussed, to distinguish two kinds of self-love. To Aristotle the highest a man can seek is self-love of the higher type. In this it seems to me Aristotle is nearer the truth than is Royce.

unity in variety¹⁹ In interpretation we have the true triad. Is it not simply, as before, ideally viewed? Is not its attempted concrete embodiment forever incomplete? As with the finite thinker in the Religious Aspect of Philosophy, Interpretation is of the nature of reflection on or after the event. The fact of individuality already is, when interpretation²⁰ takes up its work.

It is submitted further that interpretation as cognitive, is, as in the case of 'thought' in the first period, not a basis upon which to found a doctrine of the *concrete* world as an Interpretation. Cognition knows nothing of a *concrete union*. It is a *knowledge* of reality. To capitalize the word and speak of it as the concrete world is a conceptual construction. Interpretation deals with the "what" of things.

IV.

In this later period we find still the presence of the absolute^{ity} (though not proved) to be synonymous with 'The Divine Community'. The Absolute is an "experience which itself includes a synoptic survey of the whole of time."²¹ In developing, from finite individuality the idea of a community, reference is made to "the power of an individual self to extend his life, in ideal fashion, so as to regard it as including past and *future* which lie far away in time and which he does not now personally *remember*."²² We are told "the genuine person lives in the far off past and future as well as in the present."²³ The absolute or the Divine Community including all time, past, present and future, is held to be the logical implication.

19. This objection to Royce is dealt with more fully in Part II.

19. See The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 378, and The 'World and the Individual' I, p. 490 f.

20. L. P. Jacks (in The Hibbert Journal, vol. XII, No. I) in reviewing "The Problem of Christianity" says that 'interpretation', as described by Royce, is adequate of "an *ex post facto* description of what has taken place when, say, a given scientific discovery has been accomplished" but not "an adequate rendering from the inside of what is taking place while the mind of the would-be discoverer is engaged in his search." "Royce is surely anticipating when he puts 'interpretation' into the cognitive process itself. Interpretation is what the process lacks, not what it possesses; and it is precisely as still lacking the interpretation sought, and is still looking for it, that knowing, as distinct from knowledge, is a cognitive function at all. The particular functioning in question is all over when the mediating idea appears." There is a distinction between discovering and the discovery. Interpretation refers rather to the results in knowledge than to the 'process in being' which is 'knowing'.

21. The Problem of Christianity, p. 286. 22. Ibid. p. 60 f. (Italics are mine). 23. Ibid. p. 67.

In the second period this time-transcendence has been illustrated by the analogy from the finite where "in our consciousness, the *now* of experience does mean just such an actual, brief but still finite, interval or period of time, within which and during which events succeed one after another."²⁴ This is a 'time-span', and "an eternal consciousness is definable as one for which all the facts of the whole time stream, just so far as time is a final form of consciousness, have the same type of unity that your present momentary consciousness, even now within its little span, surveys."²⁵ The Infinite has an all-inclusive time-span.

In this third period, "the time-order, in its sense and inter-connection, is known to us through interpretation, and is neither a conceptual nor yet a perceptual order."²⁶ "Time, for instance, expresses a system of essentially social relations. The present interprets the past to the future"²⁷ and "this whole time-process"²⁸ is in some fashion *spanned* by one insight which surveys the unity of its meaning Its value is the one empirically known to us at any one moment when we clearly contrast two of our own ideas and find their mediator."²⁹ Here we no longer have a time-span, but yet the Interpretation is not timeless. Yet as quoted in the previous paragraph, this experience is a "synoptic survey". It is submitted that there are two conceptions of time given here. One is the time-span, the other an interpretation.

We have then the doctrine of a *totum simul*, a closed or finished world. This persists through all periods and if held too strictly, leaves no room for free individuals unless it be in a sort of passive reflection or interpretation of the meaning of life. There is no room for will in action.

V.

If, neglecting the logic of a 'finished universe', we consider the nature and function of the higher or super-personal unities, much will turn on whether they are actual in any positive form

24. The World and the Individual, I, p. 421. 25. Ibid. I, 425.

26. The Problem of Christianity, II, 155. 27. Ibid. II, 280.

28. Royce notes that Bergson "rightly asserts that the world of any present moment of time is a summary of the results of all past experience." It is an interpretation. The whole interprets its past in the present to the future. But this future is not included. It is an open door, and the source of endless novelties. (See Creative Evolution, p. 340.) To posit a synoptic survey of the whole of time is to put past and future on a par in the Absolute and to make time unreal.

29. The Problem of Christianity, II, 271. (Italics are mine).

in the world. They are defined as true individuals. "Any highly organized community is as truly a human being as we are individually human. *Only* a community is not what we *usually* call a human being; because it has no one separate and internally well-knit organism of its own; and because its mind, if you attribute to it any one mind, is therefore not manifested through the expressive movements of such a separate human organism."³⁰ Now if this means an actual community—a true individual—having a mind and a will, it is but logic to interpret such as giving it supreme and, if need be, coercive power³¹ over the individual members of the community. The actual community is however a very plastic affair. Only where we have an autocracy does it really act as a whole and here the one individual mind overrides all other minds. In a democracy it is different, the common will is not actual but ideal. We have rather a collective will. "The State is a reality which is what it is by dint of the combined resolves of many human wills, through time; we individuals find the state as something apparently finished, standing there as something to be accepted; but at no time does the existence of this object become so independent that it can continue to hold its reality apart from the good will which from moment to moment recreates it."³² The state, regarded thus, will not have that over-individuality which will mean supreme power.³³ While Royce has written at times as if the higher unities are true individuals, he has not dropped the emphasis found in his earlier book, that the will of such community is reached through individual insight and choice. We have an oscillation between the two views.

I would submit that in speaking of "two levels of human life the level of the individual and the level of the community,"³⁴ Royce leaves the door open to such literalizing of this over-individuality as can mean coercion of the individual members and hence their enslavement. But if it is mediated through the consciousness of individuals we have in place of the 'level

30. *The Problem of Christianity*, I, p. 166. *Italics* are mine as marking a significant reservation. Again we have an unmediated contrast.

31. Notice has already been taken of Prof. Dewey's connection of Germany's war spirit with the philosophies of Hegel and Kant.

32. W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, pp. 140 f.

33. It is significant that in a democracy like Great Britain, conscription, in the present war, was not used until it was evident that the bare existence of that freedom would depend on its temporary violation.

34. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, 57. See also I, 165 ff.

of the community' what might be called the 'fully personal.' This is the "social level of human individuality. The efforts to embody this in society and in the state are ever tentative. Without a doubt the experience of the past is the heritage of each new individual. The organization of society provides for this continuity of life. But the new breaks in to life through the individual. God does not speak to the crowd or to the community as such. In some brain³⁵ his message comes to explicit consciousness. Life for the individual must at its best be fully personal. His decisions must ever be his own.

VI.

A further contention concerning interpretation is this. As interpretation in the finite it is a cognitive process. This implies a growing *knowledge* of reality, but not such widening of *experience* as concrete or direct and immediate as to point logically to a concrete Interpretation. The capitalizing of the word must not hide this significant difference.

"In the concrete, then, the universe is a community of interpretation whose life comprises and unifies all the social communities which, for any reason, we know to be real in the empirical world which our social and our historical sciences study."³⁶ This "single Community of Interpretation"³⁷ marks a union of a cognitive process with the objects such as we do not have in the finite. Further we do not have that which shows any tendency towards such union. We have that only which can give by direct contrast this union. And contrast does not carry with it necessarily the predicate of existence.

One would say that Royce would have come much nearer the mark logically had he reached the view of a community of Interpreters. This 'Community of Interpretation' is the new title for the Absolute. I am unable to see that Royce has found in the facts of the social as logically implicated this Community of Interpretation. This Community in its members possesses

35. Lowell in his poem "on reading Burns in a workman's car."

"All thoughts that mould the age, begin
 "Deep down within the primitive soul,
 "And from the many slowly upward win
 "To one who grasps the whole.
 "In his wide brain the feeling deep
 "That struggled on the many's tongue
 "Swells to a tide of thought" etc.

a continually wider knowledge (or interpretation) of reality. It has not a direct and immediate and ever widening experience of reality. The past is carried in symbolic or other memory form. The future is not yet. Nothing indicates an 'Interpretation' with 'synoptic survey'. As with 'Thought' and 'Will', we have here in the case of 'Interpretation' something gained not by logic, but by a conceptual contrast.

We have two views of an ultimate somewhat externally run together here: the Divine Community in a real time-order, carrying with it its past in a true interpretation to the present facing of the future *and* an Absolute, "viewing the whole time-process by a single synopsis"³⁸ and thus inclusive of the future. The first gives a teleology where the process is real and significant. The latter makes the process in time a mere means to the significant end. The reality which is eternally present is essentially static. The former gives to time its true reality. The latter, in including the future, renders time meaningless to us.

36. *The Problem of Christianity*, II, p. 272. 37. *Ibid.* II, 272. 38. *Ibid.* II, 271.

CHAPTER VIII.

Summary on the Principle of Individuation.

I.

In the first period the distinctiveness of the human individual is found in 'Reflection'. The world is eternally complete. Hence the thought of the finite individual must be an idea only. It can be valid, but not creative or constitutive. We have in Reflection *but a partial view of individuation*, since reflection is on what is already given or existent.¹ Individuality in some sense is already present, but in or through reflection it attains a higher level.

II.

In the second period the distinctiveness of the human individual is held to be the work of will or purpose. The world is a 'completed experience'. Will in the finite as achievement, or embodiment, finds no place in such a world. The finite is shut up to the possibilities of clarifying *in idea* his purpose or to *defining* his will. In so far as this remains untried, unexpressed or unfulfilled, such will or purpose seems synonymous with clarity of thought. If not exactly synonymous with thought, it is inclusive of other elements such as instincts and necessary desires, which however are to be potential rather than active. If we mean by will a passage from the theoretical to the actual then it is submitted that in a 'completed experience' there is no room for will in the finite. We get no further than a clearly defined purpose, held, as yet, theoretically. If any element is added in this period to the principle of individuation in accounting for the human personality it is this, that there must be (if action could take place) such expression as will do justice to the more instinctive parts of man's nature. Much of our past experience is still with us in the form of an attitude which is largely non-conscious.

1. John Dewey (in the *Philosophical Review* (1906) page 472) writing of thought's work says—"It serves to valuate organizations already existent as biological functions and instincts, while, as itself, a biological activity, it redirects them to new conditions and results." (Black-face type is mine.)

III.

In the third period, the principle of individuation is loyalty to a cause, which, metaphysically viewed, is loyalty to a community or in its cognitive form Interpretation.² It is still a 'finished' world when a synoptic survey includes past, present and *future*.

We can allow then, to the finite, interpretation as a theoretical or reflective process only. Except in the novelty of the triadic form by which man's social nature is proved, it seems identical with the position of the first period where reflection is taken as the principle of individuation.

IV.

If, however, we hold that the facts of finite experience do not imply a 'completed experience', and if we hold that our author has brought this theory of the Absolute to the facts rather than found it there, then we may ignore the doctrine of the Absolute and note Royce's exposition of the place and individuation of the human being in the universe. The human achievements in the time-experience will no longer be negligible temporal replicas of eternal realities.

That which constitutes the finite individual a human personality is the power of mind. It will not be reflection alone, considered as a contemplative observation of the world-order. Yet it will involve such. It will not be will or purpose as a clearly defined intention. The concrete actions will involve the fulfilling of this purpose. 'A satisfied will' can then be posited as a phase of the question of individuation. In interpretation we have a renewed emphasis on the cognitive. "Reflection involves an interior conversation."³ It is social.

It must be noted also that whether the principle of individuation be reflection, will, loyalty or the 'will to interpret', we find all are used in developing an ethical theory which I have called self-alienating. We are to live the life of the whole in 'impersonal' service. We are to take 'comfort' while our lives are incomplete that they are caught up in the triumph of eternity. To

2. If interpretation be more than a merely cognitive or reflective process it signifies such an activity as means loyalty to a cause. This latter whether reasoning or non-reasoning is a life which interprets the past to the future.

3. The Problem of Christianity, II, 138.

such a 'cause' we are to 'devote' ourselves 'strengthened' by the knowledge that we shall share or do share in that eternal triumph.

All this seems a little short of the highest. "Such vicarious happiness must be, in fact, the greater part of the actual joy of any living man."⁴ But one's highest comfort must be found within one's own will. If the world of human actions are contributions to reality, then the making of some contribution, in some way, however infinitesimally small, is the source of the highest satisfaction and will mark the highest reach of the individual. If one sublimates the rather empty and ruthless self-assertion of a Nietzsche or unites it with the finest and most intelligent altruism, one will get that which is most characteristic of man as an individual. The principle of individuation will be the urge of life toward real expression, a will to contribute or to create. Nietzsche calls it the "will to power."

4. W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 497.

Part II.

CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM.

CHAPTER IX.

The Absolute.

I.

If we count finite fact *real* enough to serve as a point of departure, what we achieve logically must not destroy that reality in our starting point. Yet free individuals in a real time-experience and an Absolute whose world is eternally and completely perfect are two incompatible¹ conceptions. An Absolute whose thought is eternally fulfilled means a world which is finished. There are no loose edges for it is given all at once. The perfect realization of the thought of the Absolute is eternal. This leaves no room for free individuals and there is indeed no reason for any temporal manifestation. If we pass over this ultimate lack of reason why there should be any finite processes in time, or any manifestation of free individuals, and if we admit the unexplained existence of free individuals, we are at a loss to see what the finite individual can do. The universe is eternally complete. The finite being then can make no difference to reality for all that needs doing is done and that eternally. If we grant further that something is done, then since it can be no contribution to reality, that something must be of the nature of appearance. This would make the relation of the finite to the infinite an Appearance. Reality relation. What further can be the nature of this appearance? What is done must not make any difference to the whole, not even in the way of novelty. There must be no

1. John Dewey (in *Phil. Rev.* 1906, p. 469 f.) says "idealism is condemned to move back and forth between two inconsistent interpretations of a priori thought. It is taken to mean both the organized, the regulated, the informed, established character of experience, an order immanent and constitutional; and that which organizes, regulates, forms, synthesizes, a power transcendent and noumenal."... "the first sense, if validated, would leave us at most an empirical fact, whose importance would make it none the less empirical. The second sense, by itself, would be so thoroughly transcendental that while it would exalt 'thought' in theory, it would deprive the categories of that constitutional position within experience." This criticism is valid if the whole is a 'completed experience'. In that case the 'thought' of the finite individual can contribute nothing to experience. No doubt the finite finds qualities which are primary but it supplies or creates the secondary ones.

originality. It must be an appearance of what is already eternally existent. One must *seem* to live the life that is eternally perfect, and to serve the Universal Will. The ideal of duty for such finite beings will be the service of 'impersonal' ends and hence a life of self-alienation. If we allow the unexplained existence and the unaccounted-for activity of finite and free individuals, the logical form of life would be this life of resignation and devotion. And this doctrine of self-alienation is found throughout the philosophy of Prof. Royce. It is more than doubtful whether the doctrine of a closed world or a completed experience is derivable logically from finite experience.² But if we forget logic for the moment and posit free individuals within a 'finished world' their manifestations are appearance, negligible temporal replicas of eternal realities.

As brought out in his first book, the finite, as thinker, is able to understand, and passively to know the nature of the whole. He is a valid thinker. But such thinking makes no real difference to the whole. It might be objected that as thinking is a form of existence even the moments of reflection as novelties would be impossible in a 'completed experience'. But of course a finite thinker assumes the validity of thought even if he were trying to deny it. This capacity for thought, enables the finite individual to understand the world process and gives him that which he may copy in the life of appearance which alone is open to him. This copying implies the self-alienation which seems to be the ethical doctrine of our author.

Finite beings, following this vicarious ideal, are to seek "impersonal"³ ends and organizations. In such attainment we "lose our lives"⁴ as separate private selves. "We are instruments"⁵ unable ourselves to "attain the Absolute Moral insight."⁶ The "vast ocean of life"⁷ or the "surging tides of the Infinite Ocean"⁸ receive us who are "drops in this ocean of the Absolute truth."⁹

-
2. It should be noted that as we regard finite experience, we see a growth in inclusiveness. But it is our knowledge of reality which is becoming greater, not an ever-widening of experience as direct and immediate relation to objects. In "The Religious Aspect of Philosophy" pp. 393, 405, Royce speaks of an "organism of thought" and the "organic unity of a series of judgments". This seems to imply that our experience as direct is ever widening, which is not the case. See on this point A. K. Rogers in the *Philosophical Review*, vol. 12, p. 48 f.
3. *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, pp. 211-213, 464. 4. *Ibid.* 442, see also 181, 200 f., 193, 218 f. 5. *Ibid.* 215. 6. *Ibid.* 168. 7. *Ibid.* 216. 8. *Ibid.* 217. 9. *Ibid.* 441.

II.

But Royce writes of the finite as a 'part' of the whole. In the Supplementary Essay in the first volume of *The World and the Individual* this part-whole relation is dealt with from analogies found in the mathematical sciences. In a Self-Representative System, the part is equal to the whole or is the image of the whole. In this part-whole relation, Royce means by 'part', not any mechanically separated part, but a significant part or a constituent element of a dynamic whole. To follow this analogy of the Self-Representative System the whole appears in each part¹⁰ and the part is the image of the whole. We are 'parts' of the whole in some such significant sense'

Now I submit there is no room in a closed or finished world for 'parts' of that nature. If a part is an image of the whole in any real sense then it must have, in some degree however slight, the power of making a real difference in the world and to the world such as we ascribe to the Universal Will. If the Will of the Absolute is eternally and completely fulfilled, then the wills of 'parts' of that Absolute Subject must be included in that which is fulfilled. If the 'part' has a will, unfulfilled in the sense at least that it needs the realization which it gets in time, then that will as a constituent element of the Absolute Will is not yet realized and hence a completed experience for the whole is impossible.

III.

Time-experience is real only in an infinitely unfinished universe. It is made unreal and unnecessary and indeed inconceivable in a finished world. Yet it is from a bit of time-experience that Royce takes his departure. His Absolutism seems to deny the foundation upon which it is built. What is this foundation? What does the finite know of time and its transcendence? We are told that "the true distinction, and the true connection, between the temporal and the eternal aspects of Being, furnish, in truth, the basis for the solution of this whole problem."¹¹

First, I have a direct experience of a time-span. I hold in consciousness more than the mere instant of time. I may increase this a little in practice. In this sense then I transcend

10. See *The World and the Individual*, I, p. 468. 11. *Ibid.* II, 347.

time that I can hold in consciousness more than an immediately present moment or instant. Now, in this time-span transcendence, there is no hint of any ability to get within the time-span the future as such. In this transcendence too the full nature of time as actual is found.

Again, I transcend time in another way. Much of my experience is past. Physiologists and psychologists tell us that none of this is lost. It exists in some physiological or psychic form. I have the idea equivalents of my actual experiences which are past. These need not be considered as necessarily in consciousness. They are implicit in my attitude. This being so, I hold my past in any moment of my experience. But here again there is no hint of the inclusion of the future.

While past experiences are held, they are held in an interpreted way. The essential direction is kept but abstraction is made from the actual stretch of time. The time-span transcendency alone is direct and immediate while the interpreted form alone promises all-inclusiveness. If the time-span were all-inclusive the second form of time-transcendence would not figure as it does with us. But the time-span gives no promise of such inclusiveness. The other form has such promise but the future must have become present in order to take this form. This implies the full reality of the time-process. In its all-inclusiveness there will be the end we call the present where the process is ever growing by biting into the future.

Now I can find no other form of time-transcendence and in neither form is the future included. The musician, holding the symphony as a whole present in a moment seems to be a case of the second form of time-transcendence. He has heard the symphony before, and, abstracted from the actual time-stretch, he holds the music then in the grasp of a moment. It is thought-content, not the actual music.

Now in a 'finished world' or 'completed experience' all temporal processes, however fragmentary and incomplete are included. And not only are the past and present there; but the future¹² also is eternally existent. I submit that we have no analogy in the finite for the inclusion of the future in such

12. Of course in Royce's view of the Absolute as holding all of time in one time-span, there is no future for the Absolute. But it is future for us and for us the future has a sense of non-existence. If it is actual for the Absolute it must exist. Then what I may do to-morrow both is existent and non-existent. This is obscure. We might think of a time span including the past up to the present. But to include the non-existent future is impossible. At least it seems so to me.

time-transcendence and hence it is an unmeaning¹³ statement, to say that the future is present eternally to the Absolute. Neither form of time-transcendence found in the finite gives a hint of such forestalling of the actual coming of the future into the present. The form of time-transcendence, as inclusive of the future, makes time unreal, and, as stated above, this cuts away the foundation of fact on which the doctrine of the Absolute is built. I submit that we must hold to the reality of the temporal and in no way go beyond the limits set by what we know of time-transcendence in our own experience.

Prof. Royce has passed beyond these limits. Dealing with time transcendence in the Absolute, he has spoken of it as a time-span.¹⁴ He refers to the time-span of the finite, and carries it over, in analogy, to the time-span of the "eternal consciousness."¹⁵ "The type of empirical unity is the guide." "The eternal insight observes the whole of time."¹⁶ "The difference is merely one of span."¹⁷ Yet we find that the future turns up as included in the time-span of the Eternal. Or again something of the second type of time-transcendence is noted for "Time is known to us, both perceptually, as the psychologists would say, and conceptually."¹⁸ There is the 'specious present' or time-span, and also the ability to hold a past even event as present in consciousness. I submit that there is here a confusion of two kinds of time transcendence, and also a false inclusion of the future. The attempt to leave the choice of the future to the determination of the individual¹⁹

13. Wm. James in "The Will to Believe" p. 181 note says, "a mind to whom all time is simultaneously present must see all things under the form of actuality or under some form to us unknown. If he thinks certain moments as ambiguous in their content while future, he must simultaneously know how the ambiguity will have to be decided when they are past." This seems a gratuitous fiction.

In an address in the year 1907 on "The Relation of Time to Eternity" (and quoted by A. O. Lovejoy in *The Philosophical Review*, 1909, p. 497 f.) J. M. McTaggart says, "When taking Time as real as we must do in every day life, we are endeavouring to estimate the relation of Time to Eternity. We may legitimately say that Eternity is future".... "We must conceive of the Eternal as the final stage in the time process..... Time runs up to Eternity and ceases in Eternity." The states of the time-process are increasingly adequate in their representation of reality. Full adequacy would mean the ceasing of the process. We would have timeless reality. Eternity is rather the successor of time than that which holds the time-process in a time-span.

14. If the Absolute includes the whole of time in a time-span then it would seem to imply that the particular moments would be alike indifferent to the eternal and ever remain fragmentary. Yet we read again that "when I consciously and uniquely will, it is I then who just here am God's will or who just here consciously act for the whole." (Compare *The World and the Individual*, I, pp. 425 and 468.) Here are two contradictory ideas of the whole, one is static, the other dynamic. The former, if held, would certainly call for duplicate experiences for infinite and finite. The second would seem to cancel human initiative and the time-span of the static theory. Just how the future can be eternally present in such a dynamic whole is not clear.

15. *The World and the Individual*, I, 421, 425. 16. *Ibid.* II, 144, see also 147. 17. *Ibid.* II, 145. 18. *Ibid.* II, 113, 115. 19. See *Ibid.* II, 148.

is more just to the facts than to the logic of his position. How can the future be present and yet the choices be unmade?

When we come to the third period, it seems to me, Royce is using in his doctrine of interpretation the second form of time-transcendence. My past is with me in the present as I face the future. Every experience helps to make me what I am and what I am affects the experiences that I am having. My attitude makes a difference in the present to the events that are transpiring with me. "The time-order, in its sense and interconnection, is known to us through interpretation, and is neither a conceptual nor yet a perceptual order."²⁰ Interpretation is triadic. "The present interprets the past to the future."²¹ Yet even this use, which seems to give to the future its true place, is vitiated by the dragging in of the older time-span conception and that too as inclusive of the future. The "whole time-process is in some fashion spanned by one insight."²² We read of "a synoptic survey of the whole of time."²³ It is based on "the power of an individual self to extend his life, in ideal fashion, so as to regard it as including past and *future* events which lie far away in time, and which he does not now personally *remember*."²⁴ The dragging in of the future on a basis which is unreal is evident in the passage. Surely we do not *now* remember the *future*.

It should be emphasized that in the second form of time-transcendence which we find in our experience, the past is present in a vicarious or representative way. It seems to me that interpretation bears the mark of this type of time-transcendence. If so, it must be noted that the past, as such, is not *directly* and *immediately* present to the Interpreter. The whole as the *direct* or *immediate* relation of the Absolute as Subject to the World as Object is not conceivable under this form of interpretation which we find in the finite. Interpretation implies a time-process. We have an attempt on the part of Royce to take in combination two phases of the finite which show no signs of uniting, i.e. direct experience and all-inclusiveness. I submit that in *such* 'synoptic survey' time is unreal. And free individuals need, for the reality of their freedom, a time experience which is also real.

20. The Problem of Christianity, II, p. 155.

21. The Problem of Christianity, II, p. 280. 22. Ibid. II, p. 271. 23. Ibid. II, p. 286. 24. Ibid. II, 61. (Italics are mine).

IV.

We are told that "foreknowledge in time is possible only of the general, and of the causally predetermined, and not of the unique and free" and "hence neither God nor man can perfectly foreknow, at any temporal moment, what a free-will agent is yet to do. On the other hand, the Absolute possesses a perfect knowledge at one glance of the whole of the temporal order, present, past, and future. This knowledge is ill-called foreknowledge. It is eternal knowledge."²⁵

The ambiguity in the word 'eternal' has already been pointed out. It may be said of the 'foreknowledge of the causally predetermined' that such seems to mean that,—given the original cosmic formula and assuming the conservation of energy and the indestructibility of matter and the outcome is a necessary result which one may deduce or predict. But is this foreknowledge 'eternal knowledge'? It is the assertion of 'universal validity' rather than that *direct* and *immediate* knowledge which is ascribed to the Absolute. Then too the combinations of atoms and molecules vary and change and while the quantity may be held as invariable, the arrangement of them is ever new and so they have a real future that it seems impossible to foreknow, i.e. as regards order.

The difficulty is even greater when we consider the so-called secondary qualities. The order and arrangement of the physical, to which we refer primary qualities, is ever *changing*. In the secondary qualities, we see that which the individual is ever *creating*.²⁶ No cosmic formula will enable one to predict the moment and place of creation. These secondary qualities may not have the gross reality that physical nature possesses, yet they are real. We have here "a process of absolute, unpredictable, and inexplicable creation of new realities out of nothing."²⁷ Just how these *new* existences are 'eternally' foreknown is obscure. Primary qualities may be known. But

25. The World and the Individual, II, p. 374. James Ward, in "The Realm of Ends" p. 313, holds that Royce here distinguishes between God and the Absolute. The latter is inclusive of God and free-will agents. God cannot foreknow but the Absolute does. This, it seems to me, is a misinterpretation of Royce.

26. See "The Problem of Knowledge" D. C. Macintosh, pp. 314, 323. "Color . . . is the created product of spirit."

27. A. O. Lovejoy, The Philosophical Review (1909) p. 489. A paper on "the obsolescence of the Eternal."

secondary qualities are unpredictable. The arrangement or order of the reality to which we ascribe primary qualities ever presents novelties. The secondary qualities are undoubtedly such. Are all such novelties real or illusory? A 'completed experience' would render them illusory. The attempt to find their reality in an 'eternal' foreknowledge of them leaves the point very obscure.

V.

The term 'eternal', if used thus in relation with the term 'temporal', must have some community of meaning. The eternal cannot be simply 'not the temporal'.²⁸ A blank negation of the temporal is an irrelevant negation.

When then we read, that "as there is an eternal knowledge of all individuality, and of all freedom, free acts are known as occurring like the chords in the musical succession, precisely when and how they actually occur."²⁹ It seems natural to suppose that the term 'eternal' has some functional relation to the term 'temporal'. But the 'musical succession' is only grasped in this way after a rehearsal in which it has gone through the actual stretch of time of playing. Now we can hardly think that the present time-order is a *second* rehearsal. The illustration from music involves a necessity of having heard the music produced at least once before. Even in the mind of the composer, however rapidly the creation takes shape, it takes actual time. *Afterwards* he may hold it in an all-in-one-instant manner. It is not clear then what it is to have 'eternal' foreknowledge of a *first* production. Time and eternity are not made commensurable by the juxtaposition of the terms.

The eternal consciousness is in some sense to be *about* temporal and changing objects and further is to include and individuate consciousnesses that work in a time-order and through successive experiences. I have shown two forms of time-transcendence in finite individuals. In the form of a time-span or in the vicarious or representative form³⁰ in which our past ex-

28. "The Conception of God", p. 348. "The Eternal Now is simply not the temporal present."

29. "The World and the Individual", II, p. 374.

30. In the *Philosophical Review* (1902) p. 405. J. Dewey (reviewing *The World and the Individual*, vol. II) says "Prof. Royce seems to have two minds about time and two about eternity. On the one side, the temporal process in each and every phase is equally fragmentary and finite. The eternal is simply the temporal process taken as an object of knowledge all at once. Here there is no organic re-

perience is present with us, the nature of time is not lost. But the future is simply not yet existent. Further we may note in the second form of time transcendence that the finite being in his increase of knowledge of reality is not gaining an ever wider and wider *direct* and *immediate* experience of reality. The time-span transcendence is ever limited in the finite. Succession also enters both forms of time-transcendence. It shows no tendency in any way to change its nature to simultaneity. It is a native of the time-order. Now in the senses mentioned I can be about objects and events in the time-order. It seems possible to postulate a consciousness of time-span so extended that all the past is present in an instant, or a universe which carries its history ever with it. But eternity is to transcend time in the sense of including the future. This is not to merely transcend time but to ignore it, and to be separate absolutely from it. Time and such eternity are incommensurable.

VI.

This absolute, Royce holds, has individuated finite individuals. The Whole is a "completed experience" in an eternal instant. But these 'parts' pursue a temporal existence. Each part is temporally ever fragmentary and imperfect. Yet the nature and reality of these parts are necessary to the completeness of the whole. This Eternal is then in relation to much that changes. Yet it loses not its eternity. It is eternally fulfilled and complete. How is it possible that a relation between the eternal and the temporal can be unchangeable when one term in the relation is one of change? I cannot find that Prof. Royce makes this clear and to me it seems self-contradictory.

The difficulty is not rendered less so when we find that the complete Self of the finite being is this Absolute Self which is the Eternal. One might ask with Sidgwick "What becomes of the unity of the individual's consciousness when it is thus split up into an eternally complete consciousness out of time and a

relationship between eternity and any particular temporal portion. The other view is that the meaning of the whole time-process somehow manifests itself in every member of the process. Each part of experience has an eternal meaning, because it really embodies in its own significance the meaning of all others, being linked to them in the Absolute."

function of an animal organism which this eternal mind, somehow limiting itself, makes its vehicle."³¹

It seems but just to demand, that, when one starts from finite experience which is in a real sense a temporal experience, and passes to an eternal experience one must make the steps such that others may see the way. If this is not done the passage in question will seem mystical or even verbal. Until time and eternity are shown as commensurable we are condemned by our thinking as beings in time to hold that time at least is real and knowable by us. If time and eternity are incommensurable, it seems but words to say that an eternal being has relations to a temporal one. If the Eternal Being needs in any sense the endeavors that appear in time in the careers of empirical egos, then the eternal being is not out of time. To assert a real relation between the eternal and the temporal reduces the eternal to the temporal.

We may challenge the right of Prof. Royce to say, before he has made clear this relation of the temporal and the eternal, "*Our comfort lies in knowing in all this life, ideals are sought, with incompleteness and with sorrow, but with the assurance of the divine triumph in Eternity lighting up the whole.*"³²

VII.

While this relation of the temporal and the eternal remains obscure, it seems impossible to hold that the Absolute has been proven to exist. Hence one cannot say that the problem of the principle of individuation has been cleared up. And if the logical relation of the Absolute to the finite is not indubitable we cannot begin from that larger side in our explanation of the lesser. We cannot, that is, approach the finite self from

31. As quoted by A. O. Lovejoy in *Phil. Rev.* 1909, p. 493, from Sidgwick's "Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau." (1902) Ch. I.

32. *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 411. (Italics are mine). The Problem of the presence of evil in a perfect universe is obscure in the same way as is the question of the relation of time and eternity. For Royce there is eternally present in the Absolute, the evil and the good will which annuls it. But, in the finite, there is, in the time-process, the suffering of suspense and of the sorrows unsolved. Just how the Absolute, in its eternal and simultaneous consciousness of the evil and triumph over it, could have the grief of despair and hope, deferred, seems hard to understand. While the meaning of the term eternal is obscure one does not know whether in an 'eternal consciousness' the evil and its sting is present at one and at the same time with the triumph. If they are simultaneous, it would seem as a 'painting of a sorrow'.

the side of the wholeness, a world-view which we have reached in thought by mere contrast, not by logic.

I say *contrast*. I find in my cognition two phases. There is that form found in direct and immediate experience. There thought is working with original sensations and perceptions. It is conscious of them as new and as marking present experience. But the present moves across the narrow time-span of my direct consciousness and becomes past. The actual stretch of time is eliminated. In memory, image or kinesthesia, the past remains on in the present. Thought may work over these memories. In doing so it has full recognition of such as past, and that, in whatever sense they remain, they are the *equivalents* or representations of past experiences. The reference is not lost. Now in my experience it is this *knowledge* of what is past which grows. It is *present* with me but not however as direct experience. It is a *knowledge* of reality. The direct experience with its narrow time-span may widen a little. But its significance does not lie in any evident tendency to grow ever wider and wider.³³

Now the Absolute as described is a whole and is a direct experience. The logic of *my* finite experience is an ever widening *knowledge* of reality together with a non-expansive time-span. Yet it is this latter as expanded infinitely which is ascribed to the Absolute. This is not the logic of finite experience but a straight contrast based on the *concreteness* of my direct or immediate experience. But if it is a contrast, we must see that it remains still in the region of the formal or conceptual.

On the other hand there is logic in the view of a comprehensive unity of knowledge. It is the unity in the individual knower's thought and life manifests an ever widening reduction of his experiences of reality to this knowledge form. We have thus the experiencing mind and its accumulated knowledge of reality.

We have then to look for the principle of individuation not to some all-inclusive Absolute, but to the nature of the in-

33. Kant in a letter to Marcus Herz in 1780 writes "that we cannot assume the human understanding to be specifically the same as the divine, and only distinguished from it by limitation, i.e. in degree. The human understanding is not, like the divine, a faculty of immediate perception, but one of thought, which, if it is to produce knowledge, requires alongside of it, or rather requires as its material, a second quite different faculty, a faculty or receptivity of perception." (See as quoted by A. Seth in *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 33, note.)

dividual in himself. We find a certain instinct for reality or will to live in all levels of human life. Some unifying and directive value-seeking impulse is in even the pre-self-conscious stages of life. One might postulate some sort of absolute and personal value that unifies the special instincts and necessary desires. Nietzsche has called it the 'will to power'. If power is read in its higher meanings, this may not be too vague a title.

And now it will not do to select some high level or phase of individual life and explain the lower by it. To speak of rational self-activity"³⁴ as the mark of the true self is to do less than justice to the pre-rational and instinctive levels of life. We find too on a high level of human life activities which are carried on in habitual forms where reasoning or reflection is not explicit. There is also the intuition that succeeds reflection.

The Absolutist tends to define the individual in terms of content or relations. This enables him to think of the content in a large way. It is freed from the limitations of time and space, from the peculiarities of individuals. Of course he refers to actual or concrete life. But because we must speak of reality in the words and terms of what is intellectual, there is always the danger of mistaking this intellectual content, as abstracted from time, these relations, etc., for actually existing selves. Now if I would define a man I can say,—the name *he* has is, etc.,—*he* lives at, etc.,—*he* has a certain business, etc. But I can not say that when I have exhausted the relations and activities or content of his life I have given the individual. I have assumed him in every concrete situation. I have described him but I have not constituted him as existent. The existent individual is treated by the Absolutist according to the needs of his argument. To maintain his actuality, the individual is spoken of as many concrete relations held in unity by some unifying principle. Then, to provide for that self-transcendence which is the indication of the great and inclusive Absolute disjunctively embodied in the many individuals, we have this unifying principle suddenly growing more tangible and the various relations growing less

34. This is the term preferred by Prof. Howison (See *The Conception of God*, p. 321 note). It does not seem to me to take into account the significance in life of instincts and desires.

so. This seems to me an hypostasising of the formal and unifying principle.

But we hold that the Absolute has not been demonstrated. Can we not deny to thought its claim to finding in its *timeless* abstractions the essence of individuality? Thought is rather a function of the whole life-process than an end in itself.

If we go to the facts of life for our data, we cannot ignore the psychological elements for there can be no content without psychological embodiment. Every psychological existence takes place at a specific time in the stream of experience. Here in this concrete, one must look for the individual and, for psychological theory, the original datum is the organism already struggling to maintain and develop itself. It is from this that the life of conscious experience is slowly differentiated. We can say that "there are many centres of conscious experience, each leading its own life, determined by its own ideals, yet making itself effective in a common order of experience, and doing this by building up jointly with other intelligent agents a common world of ever increasing richness and complexity."³⁵ Here we are not among rarefied abstractions or timeless content. "The only true and real and independent existences are minds together with that which they apprehend."³⁶ The relational content found by the analysis of knowledge is of a merely logical character and we must not mistake the logical exposition of thought in general for a metaphysical determination of the object.

As we have already noted, language is the work of thought and hence all that is expressed in language must be universal. But shall we say that what cannot be uttered, feeling and sensation, etc., far from being the highest truth, is the most unimportant or untrue? This is what I mean when I define a man in terms of the content of his life. I cannot mean that the business, pleasure, home, etc., which make up the actual content of his life are to be included literally. I have abstracted their essence. They are relations. But such reasoning needs to know that "the real is inaccessible by way of ideas.... We escape from ideas and from mere universals, by a reference to the real which appears in perception."³⁷ A mere glance at

35. C. M. Bakewell. *The Philosophical Review*, vol. XX, p. 134.

36. Ferrier (Institutes) as quoted by A. Seth, *Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 31.

37. F. H. Bradley. *Principles of Logic*, 63, 69.

nature suffices to show that its leading feature, as contrasted with the logical necessity which links the different parts of a rational system together, is its pure matter-of-factness. This is not irrational. It is rather a non-rational or *alogical* character. Things lie side by side in space or succeed one another in time with perfect indifference. Of real existence one must say "the parts seem to be shot out of a pistol at us. Each asserts itself as a simple brute fact, uncalled for by the rest, which, so far as we can see, might even make a better system without it. Arbitrary, jolting, foreign, discontinuous, are the adjectives by which we are tempted to describe it."³⁸ The Absolutist would acknowledge these concrete facts, would term them the Contingent and pass by way of contrast to the timeless and logical abstractions which he then hypostasises into an Absolute Self Consciousness. Now logical abstractions can not *thicken* into real existences. The meanest thing that exists has a life of its own, absolutely unique and individual which we can partly understand by terms borrowed from our own experiences, but which is no more identical with or in any way like the description we give of it, than our own inner life is identical with the description we give it in a book of philosophy. We must not sweep existential reality off the board, under the persuasion that a full statement of all the thought-relations that constitute our knowledge of the thing is equivalent to the existent thing. It is our thought-equivalent. But something has escaped the logical net. And that something is very important.

It is submitted that Royce, in common with all Absolutists, seeks to evolve a fact from a conception.³⁹ Even in the latest book there is a very evident endeavor to make synonymous an Absolute as Interpretation with a Divine Community of Interpreters. This latter seems no abstraction. The former is such. If we conclude to ignore this continued insistence on an Absolute and accept as an *alternative* the Community we

38. Wm. James. *Mind*, VII, 187.

39. A. C. Armstrong in a review of *The Problem of Christianity* in *The Philosophical Review* (1914) p. 71 f. asks "Does the noetic ground compel the inference to the metaphysical conclusion?"

In *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 476, Royce tells us "Our special proof for the existence of an Universal Thought has been based, in the foregoing, upon an analysis of the nature of truth and error as necessary conceptions. . . . The Universal Thought is infinite, and its existence is proved independently of experience." (Black type mine).

John Dewey in *The Philosophical Review*, 1902, p. 406, says "Prof. Royce dives arbitrarily from the region of concepts into the chaotic sea of experience."

have retained in our construction, along with our logic of relations, the alogical facts of real existences.

The idea of reality as substance, as substantial, is very tenacious of life. This stubbornness points to this that reality can never be wholly permeable to idea, and yet we do know reality. Reality is something beyond categories and predicates.

VIII.

The Absolutist would define finite individuality in terms of contents and contents, to be described, must be stated in intellectual terms. They are, to that extent, abstractions. While having a type of existence, they are descriptions of reality rather than the actual things described. These intellectual constructions can be easily merged by the intellect which made them. Hence compounding of consciousnesses seems a fact or at least a possibility. But this is solely in the realm of the conceptual. Existences do not flow together. The transition from the ideal to the actual is the transition⁴⁰ which is not clear.

Finite fact does not give us much light on this point. Experience presents to us two features as we have noted. There is a present time-span and an ever increasing knowledge of reality. When I *remember* a scene or an individual, the actual and original experience is not present. Some copy or symbol of it is there. The significant thing about this symbol is its reference to that original but now past experience. To say that if I can compare the copy with the original that I have the original, and hence do not need the copy, is no argument. A fresh view of a scene always renews the representation which I bear away and the reference to that scene is the significant feature of it. This reference does not arise through comparison of the copy and the original. It is a constant feature of the symbol and hence may be assumed.

We have much knowledge that cannot be said to have come into my experience even directly. A friend describes vividly the inside form of his house. I get a picture of it which would

40. J. Dewey in *The Philosophical Review*, 1902, p. 398, says, "In any case it is not clear what justifies Prof. Royce suddenly to turn his back upon ideal constructions and fall back upon literal experiences,—seeing that his whole theory of Being is based upon discounting literal experiences as fragmentary, mere hints, glimpses, etc., in favour of what, for our type of consciousness, must be, and must remain, a wholly ideal construction."

enable me to go about it in the dark. And I have not seen it as yet. I have a knowledge of that house which has not entered my immediate experience. In my knowledge of reality I have then some equivalent or representation of reality, not reality itself.

But when I examine further my *direct* experience I do not find that sort of inclusive unity which is ascribed to the Absolute. When I experience a house across the street, psychology tells me of certain vibrations of the ether or other medium that fall upon the retina of my eye. The result is a group of sensations in my mind. Surely that which is concretely within my mind is the sensation. The house is out there beyond my eye. Of course this seems to put the mind, we are told, back in the skull. Whatever the answer may be to that charge it seems as if an attack on the skull has more immediate effect on the mind than the tearing down of the house. My direct experience of an object in the physical world is not a case of my mind expanding to include it literally. Such elasticity would call for explanation. And such an expansion ignores the facts of vision.

The contention is made here that in both my direct or present and my past experience we have no concrete union such as is ascribed to Thought, or Will. We have to distinguish two sorts of objects. There is the house across the street, the shape and color of which I become aware of at a glance. This is the actual physical object. Such objects make impressions on us through our senses. Or we get a knowledge of them through such media. We have further the object⁴¹ of knowledge. This latter is that which holds over and becomes my memory of the house. As stated, it exists with a specific reference to the actual physical object. Or, if in my direct experience I abstract from the experience my consciousness of mental activity, the mental content remaining is this object. The sense of vision is acted upon and I have a sensation. This is what I really experience. I am on both sides of this relation of knower and object. But the object is this mental content. This object has, as noted, the reference outward. In the know-

41. On this distinction see A. K. Rogers in *The Journal of Phil. Psy. and Sc. M.*, March 30, 1916, on "A Statement of Epistemological Dualism." He distinguishes "between the content of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the psychological existence of the knowledge act." The 'content' of knowledge is "not only abstract in the sense that it is unlocalized in space; it is unlocalized also in time."

ing relation of direct experience there is no such concrete union of the knower and the actual physical object such as is ascribed to the All-Knower. There is a great deal of experience which is certainly not actually within my mind in knowing. If I hold a ball in my hand I am unable to see the farther side. Yet I do not seem to have any psychological evidence for believing that the side visible to me is concretely present in a way the other is not. My knowing is of the ball and the farther side seems to be in the same sense over there as well as the side next to me. I am thinking about the two sides of the ball. The content or object in knowledge which I get in the sensation of the ball is such that I add in imaginative presentation the other side. In thought the ball is complete though I have experienced directly but one side.

What I wish to submit here is that any reading of a knowing experience in terms of an actual, bodily presence, in the unity of my experience, of the physical object, seems untrue to the facts of knowing which psychology presents to us. Neither in my direct experience nor in that form in which experience which is past is found in me is there such physical presence. My thought, experience, meaning, will, or interpretation all alike lack this which is ascribed to the Absolute. An analogy in finite experience, being absent, such experience of concrete union is unmeaning to us.

IX.

In the first two periods of his work, Royce is dealing with the relation of a finite being to the infinite. I have contended that the larger self which has been attained by contrast is not an all-inclusive Absolute but the finite self⁴² envisaged in conceptual completeness. In the later period the relation with which the period opens is the relation of men to one another in society. Royce reads the self as in reality the Self, and so here 'men in society' is read as, in reality, 'Community.' We have here, I contend, no logical and existential fact but society as we know it envisaged in conceptual completeness. It is an ideal construction. To translate the social world as we know it from the actual time-process into some super-temporal

42. See W. E. Hocking. "The Meaning of God in Human Experience," p. 290. Also G. H. Howison, "The Conception of God," p. 104.

realm is freighted with all the obscurities of 'the distinction and yet relation' of the temporal and the eternal.

The attempt further to gain an ultimate and all-inclusive unity is ambiguous. The unity of a family, a state or a crowd is assumed. The mind of a state is found *only* in the individual citizens. The genius of democracy is not unification but harmonious differentiation.

Now it seems to me that the Absolutist reads experience in terms of direct union with the actual objects. These actual unities are then rarefied by translation from the temporal to the eternal realm. We have timeless content and relations. Such easily flow together and we have the Absolute—a direct union of a self with all objects—a concrete self—consciousness.

Now no such *union* is even hinted at in finite consciousness and *all-inclusiveness*, as shown, is not an ideal for the time-span of my *direct* experience, but of my knowledge of reality which is intellectual or in some sense representational.

CHAPTER X.

Self-Alienation.

I.

In the philosophy of Prof. Royce we must not forget that finite selves are not objects of the thought of the Absolute. They are constituent elements of the Infinite as Subject. They participate in the essential nature of the whole. Royce repeatedly refers to them thus as 'parts' or 'fragments' of the whole. As 'parts', the many have a measure of separateness or of independence of each other. But they "freely unite to constitute the whole."¹ "When we urge or seek independence of character, we must do so only because such independence is a temporary means, whose ultimate aim is harmony and unity of all men on a higher plane,"² for "the One Will must conquer."³ If one inquires of origin rather than goal, one is told, "the Will individuates according to its own needs; and and if it needs for its fulfilment free individuals it will possess them and its life will be constituted by theirs."⁴ Such individuation is not to be confused with the embodiment in objects of the thought of the Absolute.

As constituents parts of the whole, the career for each is to serve⁵ the cause of the whole. "The free agents of a moral world are free only in so far as their essential moral relations ideally leave them free. They have their place and must stay in it. They have their individuality and must subordinate it."⁶ This necessity of 'subordination' is characteristic of Royce's ethical theory in each period. While admitting that possibly no philosopher has worked out so fully this necessary side of a true life, the criticism is offered that the position is one-sided and as such is abstract. 'Loyalty to loyalty' is a merely formal principle.⁷

1. The Conception of God, p. 270.

2. The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 216. 3. Ibid. p. 217. 4. The Conception of God, p. 271.

5. This subordination of the individual has already been traced to the necessity, in a 'finished' world where even novelties would be impossible, of the part seeking to 'appear' like reality. The part would thus seek to will the Universal Will.

6. The Conception of God, p. 321.

7. Royce, like Kant, sets up an absolute principle of duty, so formal and spectral, that it cannot be said to command anything in particular.

Royce has a way of drawing out a contrast⁸ between the individual per se and objective human experience to the great discrediting of the former. It would seem as if he seeks to demonstrate the latter by the discrediting of the former.⁹ He identifies the individual with the private, and the private with the merely private and this with the absolutely exclusive and isolated.¹⁰ This prepares the way for a declaration that this isolated, private will must be subordinated to the Universal Will. The criticism is offered here that if the contrast is to be thus exaggerated to make the center of initiation the will an *empty* assertion, then the other side in the contrast, however rich in content, becomes a chaos without the cause-producing initiative of the will. The contrast shows a necessary relation and one which is not to be thought of as a pair of alternatives from which to choose. It is submitted that "the self-regarding sentiment is the very heart and kernel of our volition and hence of our moral efforts."¹¹ This self-regarding sentiment is not to be construed in terms of callous disregard of others. To escape from selfishness one need not be *unselfed*. "When Aristotle says that man is by nature a political animal he means, of course, that the individual is by nature such as to find his chief good in association with other men; but he is very far from meaning that the individual locates his chief good in the good of others, or that his attitude is in any sense disinterested." . . . "Nor is the grocer in business for his health, or for mine. It is indeed true then, that the good of the individual is to be found in social life; it is none the less true that he is in society for individual ends."¹²

8. Martineau (A Study of Religion, 2nd Ed., Vol. I, p. 205) says of Royce. "So long as the author is engaged in contrasting this consciousness that 'other life is as my life' with the individualism' of the hedonist, of the sentimental cultivator of his own 'beautiful soul', or of the defiant Titan towards all that resists his fixed intent, he easily persuades us that it has the advantage over them of 'insight' over partial blindness."

9. In the Hibbert Journal, vol. No. 1, Hy Jones, (reviewing 'The World and the Individual') says that Royce, regarding the first three theories of Being as the only possible rivals of the fourth which is his own, and noting the fourth's survival of the extinction of the three, assumes that therefore it is true. (See The World and the Individual, vol. I, p. 348 f.)

10. John Dewey in the Phil. Rev. XXI, p. 72 (in reviewing "Wm. James and Other Essays") charges Royce with this exaggeration of a contrast, in order to introduce the Absolute as a necessity in order that the gap may be bridged.

11. J. E. Harrison in 'Alpha and Omega' p. 91.

12. Warner Fite. Individualism, pp. 163, 169.

II.

In the earliest period, this self alienation is very evident. The end that is sought is *unification* of all life, not *harmonious differentiation* of excellence. We have pictured to us the individualism of the hedonist, the beautiful soul, the Titan. The unification of life is surely better than these. The one alternative discredited, the other is credited with worth. "The universal will of the moral insight must aim at the destruction of all which separates us into a heap of different selves, and at the attainment of some higher positive organic aim. The 'one undivided soul' we are bound to make our ideal. And the ideal of that soul cannot be the separate happiness of you and of me, nor the negative fact of our freedom from hatred, but must be something above us all, and yet very positive."¹³ Each must thus break the bounds of his own individuality. All the many wills are to have equal footing or rather all are to coalesce in one. "Having made my self, as far as I am able, one with all the conflicting wills before me, I must act out the resulting universal will as it then arises in me."¹⁴ There results "an organic union of life."¹⁵ Our *relations* to other minds are to change into *fusion* with them. The "one highest impersonal work will be no more the work of so and so many separate men, but it will be the work of man as man. And the separate men will not know or care whether they separately are happy."¹⁶ "A wholly impersonal devotion" to "the impersonal organization of life" is thus the true life. The impassioned drama of *personal* life fades away as we try to think of such 'impersonal devotion.' "Such suppression of individuality in homage to an impersonal social organism is a relapse into the ruder tribal life, out of which personality is evolved as the higher stage, with its noble characteristics of inalienable trust and imperative Duty."¹⁷

But "we are instruments and we must be ready to sacrifice ourselves to the whole"¹⁸ for "the One Will must conquer."¹⁹ It must because it already is victor. "We know only that the highest Truth is already attained from all eter-

13. The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 193. 14. Ibid. p. 172 f. 15. Ibid. p. 194. 16. Ibid. p. 211 f.

17. Martineau. The Study of Religion, I, p. 206.

18. The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 215 f. 19. Ibid. p. 217. 20. Ibid. p. 478.

nity in the Infinite Thought, and that in and for that Thought the victory that overcometh the world is once for all won. Whatever happens to our poor selves, we know that the whole is perfect."²⁰ It is this comfort that is with us even though "we know nothing of individual immortality."

If we have not here an altruism which sinks the self in the service of others, we have an ideal in which the self is sunk in the impersonal service of the Universal Will. It is submitted that such unification of will can be but a formal principle or will to have such a will. The world is too big and complex to get such a will in detail. But it is submitted further that such depersonalizing of oneself cuts off life from the very spring of all initiative. "Man is a being, whose life consists in trying to attain what at the start is present to him only as a demand, and because this sense of himself takes the form of a strong claim for satisfaction, the emotional accompaniment of this claim, the feeling a man has for his *right* to satisfaction, has to be recognized."²¹ The ultimate test of this 'Universal Will' can be given only in terms of satisfactions to individuals since even social welfare is an end for me only as it is *my* end. Even if we accept this ideal of a Universal Will, it is a fact that the nearest we can come to it is a "mutual realization of wills." It seems to me also that its moral character exists only so long as this mutual life does not merge or retreat into a unity.²²

This subordination of selfhood is the story also in 'The Spirit of Modern Philosophy'. "It is just endurance that is the essence of spirituality. Resignation is part of the truth,—resignation of any hope of a final and private happiness."²³ But in our finitude we have one '*comfort*' for "if we have the true insight of deeper idealism, we can turn from our clasp to him, who is our own true and divine self, and can hear from him with absolute assurance this one word. 'O ye who despair, I grieve with you. Your sorrow is mine. I suffer it all, for all things are mine: I bear it, and yet I triumph,'"²⁴ It is not for us to have a private happiness when the "Logos is our own fulfilment."²⁵

21. A. K. Rogers "The Rights of Man" in the International Journal of Ethics, vol. 22, p. 423.

22. See Martineau, *Ibid.* p. 205. 23. *Ibid.* p. 263.

24. The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 470. 25. *Ibid.* 470..

III.

Reference has been made to Royce's use of contrast and of *rigid* alternatives. If the individual per se is taken as absolutely isolated and over against such possible life is placed the rich context of any actual life, one feels that the latter must be chosen. It is agreed here that nothing of this rich context is to be omitted. It is agreed further that most of that which we may call the content of any life is made up of this context. All that is involved in vicarious happiness is not to be slighted for an instant. The contention is that, however lofty such a vicarious ideal may be, it stops short of the highest.

In actual life rigid alternatives are not so common as in conceptual construction. No unmixed individualism exists except in the constructions of thought. And no purely impersonal career exists except in the same realm of ideals. Actual life shows a mingling of ideals. One may pursue one's way indifferent *largely* to the welfare of others. While ruthless in competitive business one may show ideal home affection. The issue seems to lie not so much between a personal demand and an impersonal service, as between personal demands and personal convictions as to how demands are to be realized.

It may be that some relations in life seem impersonal, but they are rather such as are not consciously personal. Many relations in life, when forming, are replete with personal feeling, but having been found acceptable and satisfactory, they have taken an assured place in the habitual. The personal sense has become implicit. It is contended that a cause which becomes impersonal in reality soon ceases to command the service of men. No impersonal cause 'fascinates' one. It is evident that the distinction of selfish and unselfish is not synonymous with the distinction of personal and impersonal. Indeed the truly unselfish is the truly personal.

Psychology informs us that every experience, from the simplest up, is affectively toned. These primary elements enter into complex forms such as feelings, emotions and sentiments. It is hard to find any other finally decisive evidence that a

certain course is the best than the personal²⁶ sense of satisfaction and intellectual approval. The intellect might in theory acquiesce in a sinking of the self. But it would be limited to a *theoretical* approval. Real choice is ever between *personal* desires. The would-be conqueror is not happy in defeat. Choice has not been his. The patriot is not happy in giving up all personal satisfaction to love his country and to die for it. The conqueror, in defeat, may study the value of *resignation*. The dying patriot knows what *renunciation* means²⁷. A happiness of a finer strain is his and he is not defeated even in his death. With a Nathan Hale, he could wish he had more than one life to offer; for his highest desire is realized. Now, as noted before, the limitation in the view of Prof. Royce is not that he does not mention the patriot, but that he deems his death for his country an impersonal service or rather a service of an impersonal cause. It is contended that life and its interests up to the highest are personal. My country's welfare is an end for me only as it is my end.

When I read that moral individuals "have their individuality and must subordinate it,"²⁸ it appears that Royce is using the method of contrast and doing less than justice to the fact that the springs of moral conduct are ever personal. It is not a sufficient answer to this charge to point to the personal choosing of such subordination. To choose to ignore, to depersonalize oneself, if possible at all, is to cut oneself off from that which is at once the source of initiative and the ultimate test of that which is acceptable. One might ask, if *all* choose the impersonal, who will initiate a cause? Interest is a term with a personal reference. Indeed pure altruism would be possible only where great leaders were not pure altruists.

To substitute for personal satisfaction and personal happiness in the temporal a resignation which takes comfort in the somewhat intangible or super-temporal eternal triumph is to do less than justice to the inherent sense of personal right. If the temporal process or experience as such, is only a superficial and negligible vehicle of eternal ends, why be even impersonal? The very nerve of our endeavors in the time-pro-

26. A. K. Rogers in *The Philosophical Review*, 1915, p. 594. For the approval of new issues we must "go back of institutional reason to those personal springs of conduct which, to be sure, need rationalizing, but which nevertheless in themselves are ultimate facts, that set the direction and supply the motive power, of all our ends."

27. See W. E. Hocking. *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 501.

28. *The Conception of God*, p. 321.

cess is the desire to achieve something even there in the same time-process. It is only in retreat that one seeks the comfort of a second best. Even if "my true comfort can never lie in my temporal attainment of my goal,"²⁹ it will be very discouraging if I do not make some temporal achievement. Positive action, initiated by the conscious will, cannot maintain itself if this sense of comfort permeates one's being. Comfort in an eternal triumph rather than a temporal success will tend thus to the passive and as a principle marking the highest attainment of the individual it will lack "launching power."³⁰ Life reveals that all ends are glimpsed by persons and pursued as personal ends. It does not present the rigid alternatives which have an existence in the doctrines of Royce. In a world too large for any one to compass even in his thought, we seek a harmonious differentiation of life rather than unification. Even if I attempt to estimate the meaning or significance of the world's trend, my account is very deeply influenced by my pre-possession. These are so largely outside of or beyond the reach of direct consciousness that the attempt to be other than personal is surely futile.³¹

The self-alienating ideal permeates the whole of the second period. The ultimate ideal is unification. To this end the self is subordinated. That life which is allowed to a subordinated self is pictured in true Roycean fashion as ever temporally incomplete and disappointing. Over against this is the eternal triumph. One gets a joy amid defeat and subordination in that one shares in this eternal triumph. "In the Absolute I am fulfilled."³² Surely something of my zest in action will be lost if I thus lose confidence in the *worth* of my temporal endeavors.

IV.

At all stages in his work Royce has made explicit that the finite individual has the privilege of choice. In the earliest

29. *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 407.

30. W. E. Hocking in *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, p. 500.

31. E. B. McGilvary (in the *Hilbert Journal*, Oct. 1915, p. 59).

Writes, "when we seek to see with open eye and to understand with open mind, we should recognize that our noblest impartialities are partialities eulogised. Their nobility is derived by patent from our fundamental preference." p. 62. "That which we prefer above all else when we know all that we can know about it, that for us is best."

32. *The World and the Individual*, II, p. 409. This is the point of view of the whole chapter on Evil (IX.)

book we are told that the Divine Thought comes into the 'consciousness' of the individual³³ It is surely evident that it does not come as a clear cut ideal, but rather as one *tentatively formulated* and as one to be tested *empirically*.³⁴ There will be no distinction between the ardor of service of one who has made a mistaken interpretation and the ardor of one who has had clearer insight. All sorts of charges and counter-charges will be in order when these varied interpretations seek for universal application. The plea of impartiality, of conscientiousnesses, or of disinterestedness will hardly avail to settle the *positive* points under dispute. To one disputant, the position of another will appear as biased and personal.³⁵ One may decide to choose impersonal ends and to affect a detachment from all that is merely personal, yet one's actions will be read by others in terms of personal ideals and endeavors.

Now it does not appear to me that in a community 'unification' per se is the ideal. Hence a unitary, impersonal and common aim is not the essential. An harmonious differentiation of interests appears to be a better working ideal. The individual then springs from the common life and in the finding what his true nature is or what he is built to do or achieve, his distinctiveness arises. The impulse toward individuality has come from below not from above. I mean that in approaching the question of individuality the biological is the starting point. The endeavor to begin with the thinking and willing of an Absolute, while productive of much in the way of idea, seems to miss contact with reality.

In the third period the natural ideal of morality for a community is vitiated by the effort to reconcile community with the older absolutism.³⁶ The all-inclusive community is attained through lesser unities which are true individuals, with minds, wills, etc. All this is to be attained in thought by the individual consciousness, and having attained the vision of these

33. See the Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 470.

34. "If the issue between moral ideals is to be decided by the issue, why should one ideal politely, nay, ignominiously, withdraw from the scene of conflict. And who is to fight for my ideals but myself and those who share them with me? E. B. McGilvray—Hibbert Journal, Oct. 1915.

35. The peace advocates on the Ford Armada soon found that great causes do not voice themselves outside of the limitations of persons. No superhuman unitary view was forthcoming. Even harmony existed only formally.

36. J. E. Harrison in "Alpha and Omega" p. 195, says, "Royce intends his old monism. Yet his emphasis on the will, then on the community or herd, links him back with the newer psychology of McDougall which is not monistic." Ib. 29 "At the outset, what draws society together is sympathy, similarity, uniformity."

higher unities, one must choose to serve these impersonal ends.

We have noted the difficulty which arises in that the individual is to be convinced in his own mind of the actual nature of these unities and because further his allegiance is ever a matter of personal decision. No matter what one may do, it will look like personal origination and personal ambition.

The only reason that 'loyalty to a cause' or 'loyalty to loyalty' seems so unmixcd and so detached from all personal bias, is because they remain in the region of the formal. In the realm of objective conditions, some one always initiates causes, and in so doing carries to an outsider the appearance of being personally interested. Now it is submitted that this must be so and being so is quite natural. If there is in men in society the bare determination that there shall be a law, this bare will is alike in all. It is a unitary attitude if one is longing for unity. But it is destined as it enters the world of affairs to break up into innumerable interpretations of its practical meaning and application. It will be, no doubt, a good thing to have all resolved on unanimity rather than strife. But the actual world is too large for the ambitious dream of one will embodied.

While the alternative position of the third period opens the way to a true principle of morality, the ideal of self-alienation is retained³⁷ through the effort to retain the notion of an Absolute. In *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, in the chapter on Individualism the idea of individuality is emptied of all contents except the bare boast that one is such. The man who holds to an individualistic principle in morals is shut off from the real world. He can but 'gesticulate'. Hence "there is only one way to be an ethical individualist. That is to choose your cause and then serve it, as the Samurai his feudal chief, as the ideal knight of romantic story his lady,—in the spirit of all the loyal."³⁸ The individualist is one who seeks "*only* the mere collection of his private experiences of his personal thrills of fascination." The loyal one seeks "success and from moment to moment indeed thrills with a purely fragmentary and temporary joy in the love of service. But the joy depends on a

37. See "The Philosophy of Loyalty," p. 354 f. "Your true good can never be won and verified by you in terms to which the present form and scope of our human experience is adequate. The best that you can get lies in self-surrender and in your personal assurance that the cause to which you surrender yourself is indeed good." *Ib.* p. 369. "My success is real only in so far as some conscious life, which includes my ideas.....observes my success." Italics are mine.

belief in a distinctly superhuman type of unity of life.³⁹ The criticism is offered here that unless a cause depends on more than a belief, it is likely to obtain little more than the intellectual assent. Further when I ask myself how far my citizenship is based on a belief in a superhuman type of life, I fail to find that such a theory figures much in the matter. The life of a citizen may be superhuman, if I read the human in terms of a life of a recluse or a hermit. But to the average individual, life in society and the state is just human life. When I look at society, it appears to me that individuals are seeking each to live his own life, trying to find out his own powers and seeking to use such in accomplishing some line of work which gives him true satisfaction. Where I find people serving causes, I find individuals who deem those causes to be the thing which they most desire. There is plenty of evidence of unselfishness but none of the impersonal.

We are told that "to have a conscience, then, is to have a cause, to unify your life by means of an ideal determined by this cause, and to compare the ideal and the life."⁴⁰ Here we have a situation struck off in such definite terms that the doubt arises whether it deals with actual human life or moves in the realm of intellectual construction. 'To have a cause' seems to imply that causes some way are given, are *there*. One has but to cast over them a critical glance and choose. 'To unify one's life by means of an ideal' seems an identical proposition. Surely a life being unified is a life which is forming an ideal. The doubt grows that Royce is here working among *conceptions*. Causes in real life are not *given*. Some personal faith and demand brings each new ideal into the field of experimentation. There it must prove its worth and that involves those who are ready to fight for it as an ideal. They do this, not because reason has looked it all over and has given its sanction, but because of some insistent inner compulsion. "The force of an ideal depends, not on my finding it true, but on my insistence that it shall be true."⁴¹ Causes have their birth back in individual impulses and desires. It is only in

38. The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 98. See another interpretation, J. E. Harrison in 'Alpha and Omega', p. 97 f. says "one secret of the intense joy in loving and being loved is the immense reinforcement of one's own personality. Suddenly to another, you become what you have always been to yourself, the centre of the universe."

39. The Philosophy of Loyalty, p. 330. 40. Ibid. p. 175.

Possibly no better instance of the self-alienating ideal in Prof. Royce's position can be had than the opening paragraph of his speech on "The Duties of Americans, in the Present war" delivered in Tremont Temple, Jan. 30, 1916. He says "I fully agree with those who believe that men can reasonably define their rights only in terms of their duties. I have moral rights only in so far as I also have duties. I have a right to my life because it gives me my sole opportunity to do my duty. I have a right to happiness solely because a certain measure of happiness is needed to adapt me to do the work of a man. I have a right to possess some opportunity to fulfil the office of a man: that is, I have a right to get some chance to do my duty. That is, in fact, my sole inalienable right."

All this is admirable if one has a clear-cut and adequate conception of 'the office of a man' or of 'duty'. It is possible that very many *sincere* people would agree thus far and yet disagree with Prof. Royce in his application of his view given above to a specific problem; America's attitude to Germany in the present war. Such difference of opinion reveals the essentially *ideal* nature of 'right' and 'duty' as here correlated. They are stated in the most general way as if the most formal statement had a very definite reference in the world of actual affairs. 'Rights' and 'Duties' however are not there as 'given'. Individuals have more to do than just declare their allegiance to duties representing causes of wider scope than any private interest.

It is submitted that here in this clear distinction of 'right' and 'duty' we are in the realm of the conceptual. When Royce seeks to connect with actual affairs, he sets forth what is a quite debateable doctrine. The sun-clear ideal does not give guidance. One side, no doubt, would say Prof. Royce is right, the other would, at the least, say, that he had stated his own personal convictions.

What is right and hence what is our duty is only emerging gradually in the natures of men. To make 'happiness' nature's inducement to entice the individual to his duty is to do less than justice to the place of satisfaction in any man's life. Some way it is not objective reason, telling of duties clearly placed before us, that settles the question of right or wrong for us. That may do for one who *agrees* with Royce. But how about

one who disagrees. Some say that disagreement points to a more ultimate court of approval and disapproval, the individual himself. It is doubtful if any duty stands in its claim apart from individual interpretation and approval. The distinction of right and duty is another of the rigid distinctions which are found so often in Royce. In actual life my right to be truly satisfied is my duty. I find no way to choose between claims on my attention than some sense of personal satisfaction and approval. No evidence which does not satisfy *me* commands my acceptance. So far from my rights and my happiness being measured in terms of duty, the reverse seems nearer to the actual. The rigid distinction drawn between the two and the preeminence given to 'duty' seem to give an air of self-seeking to the word 'right'. The choice however is never between a personal and selfish right and a larger and impersonal duty, with a small thrill of happiness allowed one in order that one may be enticed on to the larger path of duty. Even duty must not be read in impersonal terms. A desire to further the welfare of men about me, if it wins my service, does so only because it is that in which I find most *satisfaction*. It is not impersonal or something else than a right. It is my *right* and it gives *me* most satisfaction.

CONCLUSION.

I.

The existence of the Absolute, I have contended, has not been proved by Royce. Hence the individuation traced to the thought or will of the Absolute hangs in the air.

It is contended further that the finite individual is defined throughout in terms of 'content'. This 'content' is hypostatized as the individual. The union of 'consciousness' with its content is taken as the union of thought with the actual objects of the real world. The terms 'self' and 'experience' are also abstractions of the intellect. The only change seems to be that the latter term with 'will' marks a change of the 'content' from static to dynamic terms, from thought to thinking. Will, despite its relation, as stated, to desire, is but a clearly defined purpose; an intention to act, and hence is intellectual and abstract. 'Interpretation' also is ideal construction.

Possibly no better instance of the self-alienating ideal in Prof. Royce's position can be had than the opening paragraph of his speech on "The Duties of Americans, in the Present war" delivered in Tremont Temple, Jan. 30, 1916. He says "I fully agree with those who believe that men can reasonably define their rights only in terms of their duties. I have moral rights only in so far as I also have duties. I have a right to my life because it gives me my sole opportunity to do my duty. I have a right to happiness solely because a certain measure of happiness is needed to adapt me to do the work of a man. I have a right to possess some opportunity to fulfil the office of a man: that is, I have a right to get some chance to do my duty. That is, in fact, my sole inalienable right."

All this is admirable if one has a clear-cut and adequate conception of 'the office of a man' or of 'duty'. It is possible that very many *sincere* people would agree thus far and yet disagree with Prof. Royce in his application of his view given above to a specific problem; America's attitude to Germany in the present war. Such difference of opinion reveals the essentially *ideal* nature of 'right' and 'duty' as here correlated. They are stated in the most general way as if the most formal statement had a very definite reference in the world of actual affairs. 'Rights' and 'Duties' however are not there as 'given'. Individuals have more to do than just declare their allegiance to duties representing causes of wider scope than any private interest.

It is submitted that here in this clear distinction of 'right' and 'duty' we are in the realm of the conceptual. When Royce seeks to connect with actual affairs, he sets forth what is a quite debateable doctrine. The sun-clear ideal does not give guidance. One side, no doubt, would say Prof. Royce is right, the other would, at the least, say, that he had stated his own personal convictions.

What is right and hence what is our duty is only emerging gradually in the natures of men. To make 'happiness' nature's inducement to entice the individual to his duty is to do less than justice to the place of satisfaction in any man's life. Some way it is not objective reason, telling of duties clearly placed before us, that settles the question of right or wrong for us. That may do for one who *agrees* with Royce. But how about

one who disagrees. Some say that disagreement points to a more ultimate court of approval and disapproval, the individual himself. It is doubtful if any duty stands in its claim apart from individual interpretation and approval. The distinction of right and duty is another of the rigid distinctions which are found so often in Royce. In actual life my right to be truly satisfied is my duty. I find no way to choose between claims on my attention than some sense of personal satisfaction and approval. No evidence which does not satisfy *me* commands my acceptance. So far from my rights and my happiness being measured in terms of duty, the reverse seems nearer to the actual. The rigid distinction drawn between the two and the preeminence given to 'duty' seem to give an air of self-seeking to the word 'right'. The choice however is never between a personal and selfish right and a larger and impersonal duty, with a small thrill of happiness allowed one in order that one may be enticed on to the larger path of duty. Even duty must not be read in impersonal terms. A desire to further the welfare of men about me, if it wins my service, does so only because it is that in which I find most *satisfaction*. It is not impersonal or something else than a right. It is my *right* and it gives *me* most satisfaction.

CONCLUSION.

I.

The existence of the Absolute, I have contended, has not been proved by Royce. Hence the individuation traced to the thought or will of the Absolute hangs in the air.

It is contended further that the finite individual is defined throughout in terms of 'content'. This 'content' is hypostatized as the individual. The union of 'consciousness' with its content is taken as the union of thought with the actual objects of the real world. The terms 'self' and 'experience' are also abstractions of the intellect. The only change seems to be that the latter term with 'will' marks a change of the 'content' from static to dynamic terms, from thought to thinking. Will, despite its relation, as stated, to desire, is but a clearly defined purpose, an intention to act, and hence is intellectual and abstract. 'Interpretation' also is ideal construction.

No definition or description of the individual in terms of the 'content' of consciousness can give us reality as it is. Hence such an approach to the nature of individuality casts little or no light upon that nature.

II.

The theory of an Absolute and a defining of the individual in terms of intellectual content going hand in hand, I have traced to this untenable view the defining of the moral ideal in terms which portray a vicarious or self alienating principle. The mere unity of consciousness and of ideal constructions is not adequate to the facts of real life. In the human individual, life is seen issuing from springs of desire and impulse and these, as well as explicit reflective consciousness, I regard as personal. The genius of community is harmonious differentiation of interest, not mere unification

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

- Armstrong, A. C.—A review of 'The Problem of Christianity' in *The Phil. Rev.*, vol. XXIII.
- Bakewell, C. M.—'The Problem of Transcendence' in *The Phil. Rev.*, vol. XX.
- A review of 'The World and The Individual' in *The International Journal of Ethics*, vol. 12.
- Bergson, H.—'Creative Evolution'. Trans. Mitchell, New York, 1911.
- Bible, The.
- Bosanquet, B.—'The Principle of Individuality and Value.'
- Bradley, F. H.—'The Principles of Logic'.
'Essays on Truth and Reality'.
- Browning, R.—'Paracelsus'.
- Dewey, J.—'German Philosophy and Politics'.
'The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and other Essays'.
Reviews of Vols. I and II of 'The World and the Individual' in *The Phil. Rev.*, vols. IX and XI.
'Experience and Objective Idealism' an article in *The Phil. Rev.*, vol. XV.
A review in *The Phil. Rev.*, vol. XXI of 'Wm. James and Other Essays'.
- Ferrier, J. F.—'Institutes'.
- Fite Warner—'Individualism'.
- Harrison, J. E.—'Alpha and Omega'.
- Hocking, W. E.—'The Meaning of God in Human Experience'
- Howison, G. H.—'The Conception of God'.
The Journal of Phil. Psy. and Sci. Method, Feb. 17, '16, p. 99.
- Jacks, L. P.—A review of 'The Problem of Christianity' in 'The Hibbert-Journal' vol. XII, No. 1.
- James, Wm.—'Mind, vol. VII.
'The Pluralistic Universe'.
'The Meaning of Truth'.
'The Will to Believe'.
- Jones, H'y—A review of 'The World and the Individual' in 'The Hibbert Journal' vol. I, No. I.
- Kant.—Letters.
- Lovejoy, A. O.—"The Obsolescence of the Eternal' in the *Philosophical Review*, vol. XVIII.

- Lowell, J. R.—Poems.
- M'Gilvary, E. B.—'The Warfare of Moral Ideals'. in 'The Hibbert Journal' Oct. 1915.
- Macintosh, D. C.—'The Problem of Knowledge'.
- Martineau, J.—'The Study of Religion'.
- McTaggart, J. M.—'Studies in Hegelian Dialectic. 'The Relation of Time to Eternity', an address before the California Union, 1908.
- Miller, D. S.—'The Meaning of Truth and Error', an article in *The Philosophical Review*, vol. 2.
- Moore, A. W.—'Some Logical Aspects of Purpose' in 'Studies in Logical Theory' by J. Dewey, et al.
- Münsterberg, H.—*Grundzuge der Psychologie*.
- Overstreet, H. A.—'Change and the Changeless' in *The Phil. Rev.*, vol. XVIII.
- Rogers, A. K.—'Professor Royce and Monism, *The Phil. Rev.* vol. XII.
 'Determination of Human Ends', *The Phil. Rev.* vol. XXIV.
 'Reason and Feeling in Ethics', *The Phil. Rev.* vol. XXV.
 'The Rights of Man', an article in *The International Journal of Ethics*, vol. XXII.
 'Epistemological Dualism', an article in the *Journal of Phil. Psy. and Sc. Method*, vol. XIII, No. 7.
- Royce, Josiah—*The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, 1885.
The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, 1892.
The Conception of God, 1897.
The World and The Individual, 2 vols., 1899, 1901.
The Philosophy of Loyalty, 1908.
The Sources of Religious Insight, 1911.
The Problem of Christianity, 2 vols., 1913.
Collected Essays.
Studies in Good and Evil.
Wm. James and Other Essays.
- Santanyana, G.—*The J. of Phil. Psy. and Sci. Method*, Nov. 25, '15.
- Sidgwick, Hy.—'Lectures on the Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau'.
- Sorley, W. R.—A review of 'The Philosophy of Loyalty' in 'The Hibbert Journal', vol. VII, No. I.

Spinoza.—'Ethics'.

Seth, A.—'Hegelianism and Personality'.

Seth, J.—A review of 'The Conception of God' in *The Phil. Rev.*, vol. VII.

Tennyson—In Memoriam.

Thilly, F.—A review of 'The Philosophy of Loyalty' in *The Philosophical Review*, vol. XVII.

Ward, J.—'The Realm of Ends'.

Woodbridge, F. J. E.—'The Hibbert Journal' vol. II., No. I.

14 DAY USE
RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED
LOAN DEPT.

This book is due on the last date stamped below, or
on the date to which renewed.

Renewed books are subject to immediate recall.

20 Jan '59 J M	4 May '62 SS
	REC'D LD
IN STACKS	APR 27 1962
JAN 6 1959	7 Dec '62 WW
	REC'D LD
	JAN 26 1963
REC'D LD	3 Dec '63 DB
JAN 12 1959	
	REC'D LD
21 Apr '59 LA	NOV 19 '63-10 AM
REC'D LD	1 Nov '64 BG
APR 01 1960	REC'D LD
13 Dec '60 EW	NOV 22 '64-1 PM

LD 21A-50m-9:58
(6889s10)476B

General Library
University of California
Berkeley

477918

P. B94
R67E

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

